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Abstract 
The emergence of the new IEC 61850 standard generates a potential to deliver a safe, reliable 
and effective cost reduction in the way substations are designed and constructed. The IEC 
61850 Station Bus systems architecture for a substation protection and automation system is 
based on a horizontal communication concept replicating what conventional copper wiring 
performed between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED’s). The protection and control signals 
that are traditionally sent and received across a network of copper cables within the 
substation are now communicated over Ethernet based Local Area Networks (LAN) utilising 
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages. 
Implementing a station bus system generates a substantial change to existing design and 
construction practices. With this significant change, it is critical to develop a methodology for 
testing and commissioning of protection systems using GOOSE messaging. Analysing current 
design standards and philosophies established a connection between current conventional 
practices and future practices using GOOSE messaging at a station bus level. A potential design 
of the GOOSE messaging protection functions was implemented using the new technology 
hardware and software. Identification of potential deviations from the design intent, 
examination of their possible causes and assessment of their consequences was achieved 
using a Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP). This assessment identified the parts of the 
intended design that required validating or verifying through the testing and commissioning 
process. The introduction of a test coverage matrix was developed to identify and optimise the 
relevant elements, settings, parameters, functions, systems and characteristics that will 
require validating or verifying through inspection, testing, measurement or simulations during 
the testing and commissioning process. Research conducted identified hardware and software 
that would be utilised to validate or verify the IEC 61850 system through inspection, testing, 
measurement or simulations.  
The Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) has been identified as an effective, structured and 
systematic analysing process that will help identify what hardware, configurations, and 
functions that require testing and commissioning prior to placing a substation using IEC 61850 
Station bus GOOSE messaging into service. This process enables power utilities to understand 
new challenges and develop testing and commissioning philosophies and quality assurance 
processes, while providing confidence that the IEC 61850 system will operate in a reliable, 
effective and secure manner. 
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  Chapter 1
Introduction 
1.1 Ergon Energy  
Ergon Energy supplies electricity across a service area of more than one million square 
kilometres, which is equal to 97% of the state of Queensland. With a large geographical area 
comes a large operational and capital cost. The electrical supply industry is under increasing 
pressure from customers and stakeholders to proactively reduce these costs while providing a 
safe, reliable and efficient service.  Substations play an integral part of the Ergon Energy 
network and are vital for the distribution of electricity.  Substations are essential in providing a 
connection between power stations, transmission networks, distribution networks and high 
voltage customers. Substations have two categories of plant, primary plant and secondary 
systems. Primary plant is equipment that is connected directly to the high voltage network 
such as high voltage switchgear, power transformer, circuit breakers, and voltage and current 
transformers. Secondary systems are equipment used to protect, control and monitor the 
primary plant and high voltage feeders leaving or entering the substation. These are typically 
protection relays, control and SCADA systems, metering schemes and power quality systems. 
One of Ergon Energy’s strategies is focusing on technological innovation to reduce the 
operational and capital expenditure for substation infrastructure. Any technology change that 
can potentially deliver a safe, reliable and effective cost reduction in the way substations are 
designed, constructed, tested, commissioned and during its operation life warrants further 
investigation.  
1.2 Background 
Protection relay and protection schemes play an integral part of Ergon Energy’s secondary 
systems. The protection relay function is to detect faults or abnormal operating states on the 
power system and to disconnect the faulted equipment and loads in a reliable and timely 
manner. The consequences of inadequate protection at any level of the power system can 
result in major damage, injury or loss of life, and disruptions to the security and reliability of 
supply of the network. There have been enormous changes in protection relay technology over 
the last fifty years. Electromechanical relays were the first type of protection relays that 
operated on the principle of a mechanical force causing operation of a relay contact in 
response to a stimulus. The mechanical forces are generated through current flow in one or 
more windings on a magnetic core (Alstom Grid, 2011). All of the protection tripping and 
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backup functions of the protection scheme were performed by additional auxiliary relays and 
circuitry. Figure 1 illustrates an electromechanical distance relay. 
 
Figure 1: Electromechanical Distance Relay (Brown Boveri LZ32) 
In the early 1960’s electromechanical relays were eventually replaced with static relays which 
eliminated the use of moving parts and their design was based on the use of analogue 
electronic devices and discrete devices such as transistors and diodes in conjunction with 
resistors, capacitors, inductors. In the 1980’s digital protection relays were developed and the 
change in technology introduced microprocessors, microcontrollers and A/D conversion for all 
measured analogue magnitudes and to implement and perform protection algorithms and 
digital logic. Manufacturers of these relays introduced proprietary communication protocols 
used to communicate between the protection relays and the manufacturers controls systems. 
With the introduction of this additional technology, introduced challenges with designing of 
substations, where only proprietary manufacturer’s hardware could be used or additional 
media converters were required. In the early 1990’s numerical protection relays were 
developed due to advances in digital signal processor (DSP) technology and specialised 
microprocessors that enabled functions and mathematical algorithms to be processed at 
optimum speeds. With each change in the relay technology brought a reduction in the size of 
the protection relay and an improvement in functionality and reliability due to their superior 
microprocessors and self-monitoring functions. This enabled designers to reduce the required 
auxiliary relays and circuitry within the protection schemes and allowed these functions to be 
engineered within the protection relay. During these significant technological advances in 
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protection relaying all of the analogue signals from the current and voltage transformers and 
binary input and output signals used to connect the substation protection schemes were 
achieved by the use of copper wiring. Figure 2 illustrates typical protection and control IED’s 
 
Figure 2: Protection & Control IEDs 
Testing and commissioning plays a significant role in the safe and reliable operation of a 
substation. The testing and commissioning process are designed to ensure plant or secondary 
systems operate in accordance with its design specifications prior to operation. This process 
allows confirmation that plant or equipment have been constructed and installed correctly, 
configurations of electronic devices are as intended and systems operate as an integrated 
system. The testing and commissioning philosophies and practices for protection relays and 
their associated schemes have not greatly changed over the last 50 years. Initial protection 
relay testing for electromechanical or static relays were aimed at detecting incorrect ratings 
and setting(s), inaccurate performance or failure in a protection element. This detection was 
achievied by injecting secondary voltages and currents into the protection relay and 
confirming its contact outputs operated as per the design intent. This was a reflection of the 
relay’s use of analogue signals, its variability or failure on a single phase basis and its 
rudimentary self-supervision functions (Stevens, 2009). The introduction of digital and 
numerical relays brought flexibility and expansion in the way the protection relay could be 
configured. The configuration of flexible logic and increase in protection functions developed 
an increase in the number of test performed on the protection relays. A similar process was 
applied by injecting secondary voltages and currents into the protection relay and confirming 
its logic and settings and it associated I/O operated as per the design. The use of automated 
test equipment with smart configurations allowed testing and commissioning personnel to 
perform advance simulations on the protection relays. Even to the extent of proving the 
mathematical algorithms used to imitate the protection characteristics. All of the copper 
wiring between the secondary systems was point to point tested and testing of the integrated 
protection system was completed prior to placing the plant into service.  
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1.3 Emergence of a New Technology 
1.3.1 Background of the IEC 61850 Standard 
In 1986, the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) launched the Utility Communication 
Architecture (UCA) project. The objective of this project was to decrease the expenditure in 
substation automation systems (SAS) and the integration of an open architecture and a 
selection of standard protocols that will meet the engineering requirements of power utilities 
and accepted by substation automation systems (SAS) manufacturers. In 1995, the 
International Electrotechnical Commission’s (IEC) initiated a project called 61850. This project 
was designed to define the next generation of standardized high-speed substation control and 
protection communications. The main objective of this project was to develop a standard for 
communications infrastructure for substation control, monitoring and protection with input 
from both substation automation systems (SAS) manufacturers and power utilities. In 1996, 
both EPRI and the IEC 61850 develop groups were independently developing their individual 
standards to address the interoperability of different manufacturers IED’s in substation 
protection and automation systems. In 1997, the ERPI joined forces with the International 
Electrotechnical Commission’s (IEC) Technical Committee 57 (TC57) to build a single worldwide 
accepted standard. The objectives of the standard are: 
 Provide interoperability between IED’s from different manufacturers 
 IED’s self-description capabilities and communication parameters  
 High speed communication for the required applications 
 Reduction in conventional wiring in the substation. 
 Conformance testing requirements for IEC 61850 IED’s  
 
1.3.2 IEC 61850 Standard Systems Architecture 
The IEC 61850 standard defines the required systems architecture for a substation protection 
and automation system. The standard defines three levels for representation of functions and 
communication interfaces within the substation and between substations. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Architecture of an IEC 61850 System 
The Station Level devices consist of the substations remote gateway, Human Machine 
Interface (HMI) and remote interrogation station. Within the substation control status, process 
and supervisory control data and monitoring data is exchanged between the Bay/Unit Level 
and Station Level. The Station Level communications and exchanges control, status and 
monitoring data between the substation and control centre. 
The Bay Level devices consist of protection, control and monitoring IED’s. These devices are 
connected to the Station Level (via the station bus) and Process Level (via the process bus) 
using Ethernet based Local Area Networks (LAN) and Ethernet switches. The station bus 
exchanges data within the bay level that can be used for protection, control status, process 
and supervisory control data and monitoring data. The station bus can also be used to 
interface between substations for exchange of protection and control data. GOOSE messaging 
can be utilised on the station bus for fast reliable control and time critical protection 
applications between bay level IED’s. 
The Process Level devices consist of remote I/O’s, non-conventional instrument transformers 
and intelligent sensors and control units from switchgear, transformers and monitoring 
devices. These devices are connected to the bay level via the process bus. The voltage 
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transformers (VT) and current transformers (CT) that are connected to the process bus are 
connected via an IED called a “Merging Unit”. This is illustrated in Figure 4. The Merging Units 
samples the conventional CT and VT analogue outputs and converts the values to a digital 
signal referred to as “Sample Values”. The Merging Unit digital output is defined in IEC 61850-
9-2. 
 
Figure 4: Typical IEC 61850 Process Level System (Tournier & Werner, 2010) 
 
1.3.3 Advantages & Disadvantages of IEC 61850 Standard 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantage of using the IEC 61850 standard in 
substation protection and automation systems. The advantages of using such systems have 
been highly publicised by IED manufactures, while the disadvantages can only be compared 
with current substation protection and automation systems. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the advantages and disadvantages of using IEC 61850. 
  
7 
 
ADVANTAGES 
A reduction of copper cabling and wiring between the substation primary plant and 
secondary systems 
An increase in functionality in a single IED and a reduction in auxiliary relays. 
A reduction in relays and wiring allows for additional space inside of the substation 
Interoperability between IED’s from different manufactures 
A reduction in the substation footprint with the use of fibre optic sensors (NCIT) instead of 
conventional measuring transformers 
A decrease in electrical interference of signal using fibre optic cables 
GOOSE signals are supervised, where equivalent hard wired signals between IED's provide no 
or limited supervision of connection. The subscribing IED's monitor the GOOSE message from 
the publishing IED. An IED failure or network failure will result in the subscribing IEDs 
enabling a GOOSE failure alarm. 
An increase in safety since there will be no risk of inadvertent opening of current transformer 
secondary circuits while they are in service. 
Simplified engineering process with the use of the substation configuration language and 
standard system configuration tools and decrease in manual configurations. A decrease in 
circuitry design. 
DISADVANTAGES 
Initial increase in cost to develop new substation design and protection standards for the 
company. 
An increase in Cyber security threats due to the increase use of communication networks 
A loss of communication or data on the process or station bus may delay or prevent the 
operation of protection function. 
A huge change in the skill sets on personnel that design, construct and test substation 
protection and automation systems 
 
Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of using IEC 61850 
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1.4 Project Justification 
Majority of the time new technology is introduced into the system with the concept of 
increasing safety and reliability while reducing operational and capital expenditure. The 
emergence of the new IEC 61850 standards brings this potential saving in the design and 
construction of a substation. On site testing and commissioning plays, a critical role in ensuring 
that the substation protection schemes meet their intended design and the systems operate as 
an integrated system prior to operation. Due to the significant change in the way an IEC 61850 
substation and automation system is designed and constructed with the potential of having no 
copper wiring between the primary and secondary systems, current testing and commissioning 
philosophies and practices need to be reviewed.  A full understanding of the new SAS systems 
hardware, configurations, functions and the requirements, if any to validate or verify the 
intended design through inspection, testing, measurement or simulations during the testing 
and commissioning process is essential. This is more relevant than ever before since the 
protection systems have changed from an electromechanical relay to a digital relay with 
conventional analogue inputs and binary I/O using copper wiring to digital software based and 
communication network orientated protection schemes. Only a structured and systematic 
analysing process will help identify what hardware, configurations, and functions that require 
testing prior to commissioning a substation using IEC 61850 Station bus GOOSE messaging. 
1.5 Project Objectives 
The aim of this project is to investigate and provide a better understanding of the methods and 
technical requirements to safety, reliably and efficiently test and commission and place in 
service a substation using IEC 61850 Station bus GOOSE messaging. This will provide a future 
reference and reasoning on what and why certain functions and components of a protection 
system using GOOSE messaging are tested and commissioned. 
The key objectives of this research project are as follows: 
1. To carry out a literature review relating to the IEC 61850 and IEC 62439 standards, 
Current Safety Legislations and National Electricity Rules regarding testing, 
commissioning and operating a substation, Current standards and technical papers 
and case studies written regarding the testing and commissioning of an IEC 61850 
station bus substations. A literature review on risk assessment methodology of highly 
dependable software based systems and programmed electronic systems to identify 
potential systems that could be used to analyse the IEC 61850 station bus system 
validation and verification requirements. 
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2. Identify the configuration tools, test equipment and software used for the design, 
testing and commissioning of an IEC 61850 station bus substation using GOOSE 
messaging. 
3. Analyse the protection functions that could potentially be used in the implementation 
of an IEC 61850 station bus substation and the test required for verifying associated 
IED’s logic/protection functions that uses the GOOSE messaging. 
4. Analyse the site integration test required for verifying the station bus network, 
protection inter-tripping schemes. Investigate the protection isolation requirements 
for an operational IEC 61850 station bus substation using GOOSE messaging. 
5. Analyse IED’s logic/protection functions that uses the GOOSE messaging within an IEC 
61850 station bus substation against conventional protection relay logic/protection 
functions. 
6. Develop a substation utilising IEC 61850 station bus GOOSE messaging and examine 
the methods, practices and technical requirements for testing an IEC 61850 station bus 
substation.    
1.5.1 Resource Requirements 
There are a number of resources required to complete this project. Majority of the resources 
will be essential for the testing of the IED’s and the station bus network.  Due to the expense 
of the IEC 61850 hardware and software, only a small network with limited IED’s will be setup. 
The hardware (IED’s & Ethernet Switches) for the project have been provided by Ergon Energy 
substation standards group and IED manufacturer Schneider. The system and IED configuration 
tool used for the development of the IED Files (SSD, ICD, SCD, CID) will be provided by 
Schneider. This tool is currently a BETA version of their SET system configuration tool. The IEC 
61850 compatible secondary injection test set, test leads and interface software will be 
provided by Ergon Energy’s test section. Ergon Energy’s protection group will provide the 
manufacturer IED configuration tools. Ergon Energy’s Substations standards group will provide 
the network analysing software and tools for examining the station bus GOOSE traffic. Below is 
a breakdown of the required hardware and software. 
Required Hardware: 
 IED’s. (2 x Micom P142, 1 x Micom P642, 1 x P746, 1 x P140) 
 2 x 2520 CISCO Communication Switches 
 Fibre Optic Cable for connection between IED’s and Switches 
 Doble Test Set & Test Leads 
 Laptop and required serial leads for communication to IED’s 
10 
 
Required Software: 
 Schneider’s System Configuration Tool SET (BETA Version) 
 Micom S1 studio   
 Doble Protection Suite & IEC61850 GSE 3.2 Configurator Tool 
 Wireshark software 
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  Chapter 2
Literature Review 
This chapter will provide the findings of a Literature Review that is aimed to increase the 
knowledge and understanding in the following areas. 
 Current Safety Legislations and National Electricity Rules that Network Service Provider 
and/or electricity entities need to follow for testing, commissioning and operating a 
substation. 
 Relevant parts of the IEC 61850 standard regarding the communication principles, 
communication structure (functions and models), GOOSE messaging, and Substation 
Configuration Language. 
 Communication technologies and topologies used in an IEC 61850 protection and 
automation system and IEC 62439 Industrial communication networks – High 
availability automation networks, in particular part 3 of the standard that defines the 
implementation of redundancy protocols for critical network systems. 
 Current standards and technical papers and case studies written regarding the testing 
and commissioning of an IEC 61850 protection and automation system using station 
bus. 
 Risk assessment methodology of highly dependable software based systems and 
programmed electronic systems.   
2.1 Safety Legislations and Rules 
The following Queensland legislations and National Electricity Rules were reviewed to 
determine the requirements by law on the requirements in testing and commissioning of a 
substation protection and control system and during its operational life. 
 Queensland Electrical Safety Act 2002 
 Queensland Electrical Safety Regulation 2013 
 Electrical Safety Code of Practice 2013 
 Queensland Work Health and Safety Act 2011 
 Queensland Work, Health and Safety Regulation 2011 
 National Electricity Rules version 61 
 AS 2067 Substations and High Voltage Installations exceeding 1 kV A.C 
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The review identified that the National Electricity Rules states that a Network Service Provider 
like Ergon Energy must institute and maintain a compliance program to ensure the proper 
operation of protection systems and control systems that may affect power system security 
and the safe and reliable operation of equipment (AEMO, 2015). The Queensland Electrical 
Safety Act 2011 states that electricity entity like Ergon Energy has a duty to ensure that its 
works are electrically safe and operate in a way that is electrically safe. These duties include 
the requirement that the electricity entity inspect, test and maintain these works (Electical 
Safety Act, 2002). 
The current revision of AS 2067-2008 section 9 provides the minimum requirements for the 
inspection and testing of Substations and High Voltage Installations exceeding 1 kV A.C. The 
standard recommends that verification should be achieved utilising visual inspection, 
functional tests and measuring. The standard does not provide any specific details or 
recommendations on testing and commissioning of protection schemes utilising IEC 61850. 
The standard recommends that functional test, verification of settings and circuitry and 
programming, verification of operation and configuration by measurement or testing of 
protective, monitoring, measuring and control devices should be carried out prior to service 
(Australian Standard - AS 2067, 2008). 
2.2 IEC 61850 Standard 
2.2.1 IEC 61850 Communication Structure – Functions and Models 
The IEC 61850 standard defines information models and the modelling methods to ensure the 
open exchange of information between any of the substation IED’s. The IEC 61850 information 
model is based on two levels of modelling. The first is the breakdown of a physical device (IED) 
into a logical device (LD), second is the breakdown of the logical device into logical nodes (LN), 
data objects, and attributes.  The logical devices provide information about the physical 
devices they use as host. The physical device (IED) is connected to the network by a network 
address. The IED’s hardware health and communication problems are modelled at the physical 
device level. The logical device represents a group of typical protection and automation 
functions within the IED. To achieve interoperability amongst IED’s, common functions in a 
power utility automation system have been identified and have been split into sub-functions 
known as logical nodes. The IEC 61850-7 series defines a collection of standard logical nodes, 
object classes and attributes used for protection, control, monitoring, measurement and 
power quality systems. Figure 5 shows an example of the IEC 61850 data model. In this 
example the logical device has two logical nodes. Logic node MMXU1 is defined in IEC 61850-5 
as a 3 phase measurement logical node used for calculation of currents, voltages, powers and 
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impedances in a three phase system. The data object (TotW) for the LN is modelled in IEC 
61850-7-4 as a measured and metered total active power value. Logic node XCBR1 is defined in 
IEC 61850-7-4 as a switch with short circuit breaking capability. The data object (Pos) for the 
LN is used to indicate the circuit breaker position. The data attribute indicates Boolean status 
of the circuit breaker and quality and time stamp of the bit. 
 
Figure 5: IEC 61850 Data Modelling (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2013) 
IEC 61850-5 defines two special logic node modelled under LPHD and LLN0. Logical node 
“physical device” (LPHD) is a logical node that does not refer to any function but to the IED. 
LPHD is used to model common features of the IED, which include the IED physical name plate 
and device health. Logical node LLN0 describes common functionality of the logic device such 
as data sets, report control blocks, GOOSE control blocks and setting group control blocks.  
2.2.2 IEC 61850 Communication Principles 
The IEC 61850 standard communication stack and model mapping provides an important role 
in achieving interoperability between IED’s from different manufactures.  The standard is built 
on services that are mapped to concrete communication protocols. There are three types of 
communication models used in the IEC 61850 standard. The Client/Server type communication 
services model are used for exchanging non-time critical real time data such as monitoring and 
control services between IED’s in substation automation systems (SAS). The publisher-
subscriber model is the second model, which is used for critical fast and reliable system-wide 
distribution of data. The GOOSE control class is defined in this model and is used for fast 
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protection tripping between IED’s. The third model is Sample Values (SMV) model for multicast 
measurement values. This model is used for exchanging time critical voltage and current data 
on to the process bus. Figure 6 illustrates the IEC 61850 communication model and 
communication stack according to the ISO/OSI model. The Client/Server type communication 
service uses MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification) at the Application (layer 7), 
Presentation (layer 6) and Session (layer 5) layers. The Transport (layer 4) and Network (layer 
3) layers use TCP/IP while the Link (layer 2) and Physical (layer 1) layers uses Ethernet. The 
GOOSE and Sample Values (SMV) model are mapped directly to the Link (layer 2) and Physical 
(layer 1) layers using Ethernet to enable time critical data transfer. 
 
Figure 6: IEC 61850 Communication model and communication stack (Midence & Iadonis, 2009) 
The IEC 61850-7-2 standard defines a set of abstract communication services (Abstract 
Communication Service Interface services – ACSI) which details the required actions on the 
receiving and sending of a service request. This allows for compatible exchange of information 
between IEDs on substation automation systems (SAS). Part 8 of the standard specifies the 
method for exchanging time critical and non-time critical data through LANs by mapping the 
ACSI to MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification) and ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames. Services and 
protocols of the TCP/IP T-Profile client/server are detailed in Part 8 of the standard. The direct 
mapping on Ethernet is detailed in Part 9-2 of the standard.  
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2.2.3 GOOSE Overview 
2.2.3.1 What is GOOSE 
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) messages were develop as part of the 
standard for fast reliable control and protection applications. The GOOSE messaging is based 
on a publisher-subscriber model where the GOOSE message is broadcasted on a multicast 
Media Access Control (MAC) address by the publisher IED and the subscribing IED’s listen for 
messages that are of interest. The model was constructed under the concept of decentralized 
and autonomous distribution. This process would ensure any equipment, independently of its 
location can provide a GOOSE message delivery simultaneously to more than one host on a 
Local Area Network (LAN), using multicast (Oliveira, et al., n.d.). The GOOSE messaging is based 
on a horizontal communication concept replicating what conventional copper wiring 
performed between IED’s. The protection and control applications that were traditionally sent 
and received across a network of copper cables are now communicated over Ethernet based 
Local Area Networks (LAN). Time critical protection functions like protection inter-tripping, 
primary plant interlocking and status indications, auto-reclosing and trip signals can now be 
implemented and achieved using GOOSE messaging.  
2.2.3.2 Generic Substation Event (GSE) Model 
IEC 61850-7-2 defines the generic substation event (GSE) model, which provides the possibility 
for a fast and reliable system-wide distribution of input and output values to more than one 
physical device through the use of multicast/broadcast services (International Electrotechnical 
Commission, 2010). The GOOSE message uses the GSE model. The GOOSE messaging supports 
the exchange of common data organized by a dataset. GOOSE messages have the ability to 
support both binary and analogue data values.  The abstract data classes and services of the 
GOOSE model are illustrated in Figure 7. If a substation event occurs in a publishing device the 
value of one or several Data-Attributes of a specific functional element in the Data-Set changes 
state, the transmission buffer of the publisher is updated through the local service 
“publish.req” and all values are transmitted with a GOOSE message (International 
Electrotechnical Commission, 2010). Specific mapping services of the communication network 
allow the subscriber’s buffers content to update automatically. When new values are received 
in the reception buffer they are forwarded to the relevant applications in the receiving device. 
The GOOSE message contains information that enables the subscribing device to know that a 
status has changed and the time of the last status change. This allows the subscribing device to 
set local timers relating to a given event. Due to the nature of the multicast scheme and the 
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absence of the addressing layer for the straight mapping of the GOOSE message, there is no 
confirmation by the subscriber that the GOOSE message has been received successfully. 
 
Figure 7: GOOSE Model (Zhang & Nair, 2008) 
To improve the reliability of the GOOSE message, IEC 61850-8-1 defines the requirement for a 
scheme for retransmission of the GOOSE message. This is illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: GOOSE Retransmission Scheme (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2011) 
The retransmission scheme constantly resends the GOOSE message on to the network at the 
“time allowed to live” parameter time (T0). The “time allowed to live” parameter advises the 
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receiving IED of the maximum time to wait for the next re-transmission. If the receiving IED 
does not receive the message in the retransmission time, the IED assumes that the message is 
lost.  If an event occurs in a relay and there is a state change in the dataset, the stable 
condition retransmission time will be shortened ((t0)) and the “time allowed to live” time is 
shorted (T1). This allows for a rapid spray of GOOSE messages onto the network. After this 
short burst of messages, the retransmission time increases gradually until it reaches its 
configurable value (T0).  Although this scheme enables an increase in reliability due to the 
increased frequency of the message during an event, the scheme does increase the amount of 
traffic on the network after a significant event (Oliveira, et al., n.d.). 
2.2.3.3 GOOSE Message Frame 
IEC 61850-8-1 defines the structure of the GOOSE message that allows for multicast messages 
across the substation LAN. Figure 9 illustrates the GOOSE message frame as per IEC 61850-8-1 
Ed1.  
 
Figure 9: GOOSE message frame as per IEC 61850-8-1 
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The following details the GOOSE message frame and configurable IED dataset parameters that 
are used within the GOOSE message frame as per IEC 61850-8-1. The GOOSE message syntax 
found in the GOOSE APDU is defined in IEC 61850-7-2. 
1. Header MAC 
The Destination Address is a Multicast MAC address that has to be configured for the 
transmission of GOOSE. This is defined in the standard as 01-0c-cd-xx-xx-xx.  
The Source address is the MAC address of the sending IED Ethernet card. 
2. Priority Tagging/Virtual LAN: Priority tagging is used to separate time critical and high 
priority bus traffic for critical protection applications from low priority bus load 
(according to IEEE 802.1Q). 
TPID (Tag Protocol Identifier) Field: Is a 2-byte field identifies the frame as a tagged 
frame. For Ethernet, the value of this field is 0x8100. 
TCI (Tag Control Information) Fields: Is a 2 byte field used to carry priority information, 
the virtual LAN identifier (VID) and a canonical format indicator. The user priority 
information value shall be set by configuration to separate sampled values and time 
critical protection relevant GOOSE messages from low priority busload. If the priority is 
not configured, then the default values of 4 shall be used. The virtual LAN identifier is 
an optional configuration and is set to uniquely identifiers the VLAN to which the 
frame belongs. VID is set to zero if it is not set by the configuration. CFI (Canonical 
Format Indicator): BS1 [0]; a single bit flag value. For this standard the CGI bit value 
shall be reset (value = 0). 
3. Ethernet - PDU:  
Ethertype is based on ISO/IEC 8802-3. The standard defines GOOSE shall be directly 
mapped to the reserved Ethertype(s) and the Ethertype PDU. The assigned value is 
0x88B8. 
APPID: The application identifier is used to select ISO/IEC 8802-3 frames containing 
GOOSE messages and to distinguish the application association. The value of the APPID 
type for a GOOSE message is defined in the standard as the two most significant bits of 
the value. The assigned value for GOOSE is 00. The actual ID has configurable reserved 
value range for GOOSE, which is 0x0000 to 0x3FFF. 
Length: Number of octets including the Ethertype PDU header starting at APPID, and 
the length of the APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit). Therefore, the value of 
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Length shall be 8 + m, where m is the length of the APDU and m is less than 1492. 
Frames with inconsistent or invalid length field shall be discarded. 
4. GOOSE APDU:  
State Number (stNum): Is a counter that increments if a GOOSE message is generated 
as a result of an event change within a dataset. 
Sequence Number (sqNum): Is a counter that increment if a GOOSE message has been 
sent. 
Test/Simulation: This Boolean value is used for testing and simulation purposes. A true 
value indicates that the device is in test mode and the subscribing devices will not use 
the GOOSE message for operational purposes because the message has been 
published from a simulation unit. 
Time Allowed to Live (TAL): This is the maximum time a packet remains alive on the 
network after transmission. 
Needs Commissioning (NdsCom): This value is set to true if the GoCB requires further 
configurations and the GOOSE message is invalid.  
Configuration Revision (confRev): This value represents a count on the number of 
times the Data-Set configuration has changed.  The IED is responsible for incrementing 
this parameter and is an attribute of ConfRev of the GoCB. 
Number of Data-Set Entries (numDatSetEntries): This value indicates the number of 
data present in the received GOOSE message. 
GOOSE Control Block Reference (GoCBRef): This parameter details the name of the 
referenced GOOSE control block (GoCB). 
Data-Set (DatSet): This parameter contains the object reference attributes (name) of 
GOOSE Data-Set identification in the publishing IED and the Logic Node (LN).  
GOOSE ID (GoID): This parameter is a user definable identification of the GOOSE 
message. 
Timestamp (t): This value contains the time at which a GOOSE message is generated as 
a result of an event change within a dataset. 
GOOSE Data (GOOSEData): This parameter contains the information defined in the 
dataset members that will be sent by the GOOSE message. 
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2.2.3.4 GOOSE Transfer Times 
IEC 61850-5 defines the transfer times, message type and performance classes for a GOOSE 
message. The GOOSE transfer time of a message is specified as the complete transmission time 
from one physical device transmission stack (coding and sending) to another physical device 
transmission stack (receiving and decoding). This overall transmission time consist of the 
individual times of the stack processing (ta, tc) and of the network transfer time (tb). The 
network transfer time (tb) includes waiting times and time delays caused by routers and other 
active communication devices being part of the complete communication path (International 
Electrotechnical Commission, 2013). The transfer time does not include the sending and 
receiving processing time of the functions (f1 & f2). Figure 10 illustrates the described GOOSE 
transfer times. 
 
Figure 10: GOOSE Overall Transfer Time as defined in IEC 61850-5 
IEC 61850-5 describes seven classes for transfer times. The GOOSE messages use the Type 1 – 
Fast messages performance class P1, P2 and P3. This type of message is used for time critical 
functions like protection. Type 1 messages contain simple messages such as “Trip”, “Block”, 
“Unblock”, and “Close”. The IED receiving the message will enable its related function to 
immediately operate, ensuring critical protection times are achieved on the network. The Type 
1A “Trip” performance class P1 and P2 are used for protection trip messages in the substation. 
Type 1A messages are also used for interlocking, inter-trips and logic discrimination between 
protection functions. Table 2 details the Type 1A “Trip” message transfer times as per IEC 
61850-5. 
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Performance 
Class 
Requirement Description Transfer Time 
Class ms 
P1 
The total transmission time shall 
be below the order of a quarter of 
a cycle (5ms for 50HZ) 
TT6 ≤ 3 
P2 
The total transmission time shall 
be below the order of a half of a 
cycle (10ms for 50HZ) 
TT5 ≤ 10 
Table 2: “Trip” message transfer times as per IEC 61850-5. 
2.2.4 Substation Configuration Language  
To provide interoperability between IED’s from different manufactures, a standardized support 
for system design and communication engineering was required. IEC 61850 part 6 specifies a 
file format for describing communication-related IED configurations and IED parameters, 
communication system configurations, switch yard (function) structures, and the relations 
between them (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2009). This file format enables the 
exchange of the IED capability descriptions and substation automation system (SAS) 
description between IED engineering tools and the system engineering tools. The language 
used to support the exchange of these capabilities and descriptions is called the System 
Configuration description Language (SCL). The SCL language is based on eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML) and the describing of the IED configurations and substation automation 
system (SAS) is achieved according to IEC 61850-5 and IEC 61850-7. There are four types of SCL 
files defined under the IEC 61850 and each SCL file contains the following part, which is, 
defined under IEC 61850-6 clause 9. 
Clause 9.1: A header that is used to identify an SCL file and its version/revision history.  
Clause 9.2: The substation description section in the SCL file is used to define the functional 
structure of a substation and to identify the primary device and their electrical connections. 
Clause 9.3: The IED description section describes the pre-configuration of an IED. The 
description contains the IED communication services, access points, logical devices and logical 
nodes. 
Clause 9.4: The communication system description section describes the communication 
connection between IED access points and common subnetwork or logical busses. 
Clause 9.5: The Data type templates contains the instantiable template of the data of a logical 
node that is built from data object elements. 
22 
 
The four different SCL files (SSD, SCD, ICD, CID) and configurators defined under the IEC 61850-
6 standard is implemented in different stages of the designing and configuration process of the 
substation automation system (SAS). This Engineering process is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: SCL Engineering Process (Apostolov, 2010) 
The first step of the engineering process is the use of the system specification tools. This tool 
enables the user to describe the substation protection and automation system. This includes 
the substation single line diagram and the functional requirements represented by logical 
nodes (Apostolov, 2008). The SCL file created from the system specification tools is a system 
specification description, which has an .SSD file extension. The next step in the process is to 
create an IED Capability Description (ICD) file for each IED that will be connected to the 
substation protection and automation system. This is achieved using an IED configurator tool 
and is normally a manufacturer’s proprietary software tool. The ICD file contains the default 
functionality of an IED and the information on the capabilities and data model of each 
individual IED. The IED description contains communication services related capabilities of the 
IED, the configurator related capabilities of an IED (Data sets or control blocks) and the 
functionality and data objects in terms of logic nodes and contain data objects (Wimmer & 
Wolfgang, 2005). The ICD file is imported to the system configuration tool. The system 
configuration tool is used to import or export configuration files defined by IEC 61850-6 and is 
used for the engineering of the communication system level. All of the substation IED’s ICD 
files and the substation SSD file are imported into the system configuration tool. The system 
configurator is used to configure the data exchange between IED’s and communication 
parameters for the substation protection and automation system. The system configurator is 
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also used to configure the GOOSE messages by specifying the senders (publishers) and the 
receivers (subscribers) of messages (Aguilar & Ariza, 2010). The substation protection and 
automation system configuration is now represented by the system configuration description 
(SCD) file. The next step in the engineering process is to export the configured IED description 
(CID) files from the system configurator. The CID file represents a single IED section of the SCD 
file and contains the address and specified names used in the SCD system. The CID file for each 
IED can be loaded into each IED using an IED configurator tool. The IED is now configured for 
its designed purpose in the substation protection and automation system. 
2.3 Communication Technologies and Topologies 
2.3.1 Substation Communication Networks 
The backbone of an IEC 61850 substation protection and automation system is the 
communication network. Prior to the IEC 61850 standard, majority of the communication 
between substation protection and automation devices were performed by proprietary serial 
communication systems to communicate control and monitoring functions of the substation. 
With the introduction of time critical protection functions onto the substations protection and 
automation system, a high degree of reliability, dependability and deterministic behaviour 
would be vital for the substation communication networks (Yadav & Kapadia, 2010). Both the 
station and process bus in an IEC 61850 substation is based on industrial Ethernet technology. 
Ethernet was chosen due to its cost effective, high speeds, and its high degree of flexibility 
with regards to the communication architecture (Wimmer & Wolfgang, 2005). Ethernet is a 
simple layer 2 protocol and makes use of flexible communication devices such as switches and 
routers. 
2.3.2 Substation Ethernet Topologies for IEC 61850 Station Bus 
The IEC 61850 standard does not specify any independent Ethernet network topology. 
Ethernet Local Area Networks (LANs) in an IEC 61850 substation protection and automation 
system can be built and configured using any physical topologies like trees, stars or rings. The 
network also has the capability to carry both station and process bus traffic.  Ethernet Rings 
and Ethernet Redundant Trees are the two main topologies commonly used by network 
manufacturers implementing IEC 61850 substation protection and automation systems due to 
their superior physical redundancy. L Zhang & N.C. Nair (2008) performed test to measure the 
transmission speed of the GOOSE message on a station bus between four IED’s from the same 
manufacturer using star, peer-to peer and ring topologies. The research identified that the 
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different topologies did not make significant difference on transmission times of the GOOSE 
message.  
2.3.3 Network Redundancy 
Redundancy of the station bus network is the most important function of the network. A high 
degree of reliability is critical for protection functions carried on the station bus network. A 
failure to a time critical protection message on the communication network could potentially 
cause safety and reliability issues to the greater transmission or distribution network. IEC 
62439 Industrial communication networks – High availability automation networks defines the 
requirements for substations protection and automation system network redundancy 
solutions. IEC 62439 series considers two classes of network redundancy. Redundancy 
managed within the network and redundancy managed in the end nodes. Part 3 of the 
standard defines two redundancy protocols that are specifically designed for station bus IED’s. 
The first is the Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) where the node is connected to two 
different redundant networks and the node chooses independently the network to use 
(Kirrmann., et al., 2008). The second is High-availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) protocol, 
where the nodes are solely connected the network and the network provides redundancy 
through links and switches. Both protocols provide static network redundancy mechanism and 
provides seamless switchover during failures to communication links and switches (Midence & 
Iadonis, 2009). Figure 12 illustrates a station bus network using HSR and PRP protocol. 
 
Figure 12: Station bus network using HSR and PRP protocol (Kirrmann., et al., 2008) 
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2.4 Testing and Commissioning of an IEC 61850 Substation 
2.4.1 IEC 61850 Part 10: Conformance testing 
Part 10 of the IEC 61850 specifies standard techniques for testing of conformance of client, 
server and sampled value devices and engineering tools, as well as specific measurement 
techniques to be applied when declaring performance parameters (International 
Electrotechnical Commission , 2012). The details of the testing are under a laboratory 
environment with only two IED’s connected onto the test network. This part of the standard is 
intended mainly for IEC 61850 developers and allows insurance that the device or tool operate 
correctly and is fully supported as per the standard. This allows the integrator of an IEC 61850 
substation protection and control system confidence that each device work as intended.  
2.4.2 IEC 61850 Edition 2 
Edition 2 of the IEC 61850 standard was developed to fix technical issues, improve 
inconsistencies and clarify interoperability encountered from different IED manufacturers 
under Edition 1. The second edition of the standard provides new functionalities and 
enhancements that could potentially be utilised during the testing and commissioning of an 
IEC 61850 substation. Some of these additional features have the potential to be used as 
mechanisms for in service protection isolation.  
2.4.2.1 Function Test Mode 
IEC 61850 Edition 2 part 7-4 defines the behaviour of an IED in response to test signals while 
set in test mode. IEC 61850 Edition 2 IED’s have the capability to set a logical node or a logical 
device into test mode using the data object Mod of the LN or of LLN0. Figure 13 illustrates the 
behaviour of the IED with the test flag set to “FALSE”. A command to operate the IED can be 
initiated by a GOOSE message or control operation that is interpreted by the subscriber as a 
command (Apostolov, 2015). With the test mode of the IED disabled, a command initiated 
with the test flag set to “FALSE” and the function (logical node or logical device) is “ON”, the 
IED will behaviour as normal. This will include the operation the IED’s physical or virtual 
outputs. GOOSE messages emanating from devices under test will not be processed by the IED. 
If the IED is set to test mode, any commands that are received will not be executed by the IED. 
Including the operation the IED’s physical or virtual outputs. 
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Figure 13: Test Mode - Command with Test Mode = False (Apostolov, 2015) 
Figure 14 illustrates the behaviour of the IED with the test flag set to “TRUE”. With the test 
mode of the IED disabled, a command initiated with the test flag set to “TRUE” and the 
function (logical node or logical device) is “ON”, the IED will not execute the command. 
Enabling the test mode of the IED and the IED function to “TEST” will enable the IED to operate 
when a command is initiated with the test flag set to “TRUE”. This will include all protection 
functions, outputs from the IED will be operational and the IEC 61850 GOOSE messages from 
the IED will have the quality parameter set to test. If the function is set to “TEST BLOCKED”, 
any command will be processed, the IED protection functions remain enabled and the outputs 
from the IED are disabled. Preventing any tripping to connected in service equipment.  
 
Figure 14: Test Mode - Command with Test Mode = True (Apostolov, 2015) 
2.4.2.2 Simulation Mode 
IEC 61850 Edition 2 part 7-4 defines the structure in which enables an IED to subscribe and 
accept GOOSE messages or sampled value messages generated from test equipment, when an 
IED is set in simulation mode. Figure 15 illustrates the subscription changeover for an IED set 
to simulation mode. The GOOSE message has a flag that indicates if the message is from a real 
message or the message has been produced from a simulation device. The logical node LPHD 
that represents the physical device has a data object “Sim” that is used to define if the device 
receives a real GOOSE message or simulated message. If the data object Sim is set to “FALSE” 
within the subscribing IED, all simulated GOOSE messages are disregarded and the IED will 
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continue utilising the real messages. If the data object Sim is set to “TRUE”, the subscribing IED 
will utilise the simulated messages within its internal processing. The subscribing IED continues 
to use the real GOOSE 1 message until the first simulated GOOSE 1 message is received by the 
subscribing IED. When the simulated message is received, the IED ignores any further real 
GOOSE 1 messages. The IED continues to process the real GOOSE 2 and 3 messages. The data 
object SimSt (simulation status) within the logical node LGOS (GOOSE subscription monitoring) 
provides indication when the particular subscription has successfully switched over to a 
simulation source. The simulated GOOSE 1 message will continue to be processed until the 
LPHD.Sim.stval parameter is changed to “FALSE”. 
 
Figure 15: Edition 2 IED Simulation Mode (Alstom Grid, 2015) 
2.4.3 Conference Publications and Journals 
Apostolov (2008) discussed the test system architecture and principles for the testing of 
individual devices using sample values and protection schemes that involve multiple IED 
devices. Apostolov (2008) splits the principles of testing into functional and system testing. 
Functional testing applies a top-down method of verification of any function or sub function 
and ensuring the tested element has the expected behaviour under different realistic test 
conditions. Valid or invalid inputs should be provided to the functions and the expected output 
for each test condition defines the results. Compared to system testing which evaluates the 
overall performance of the system. 
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Apostolov & Vandiver (2007) functional testing of IEC 61850 base protection relays paper 
discusses a high level comparison between testing conventional based protection relays with 
protection relays using IEC 61850 station bus technology. Figure 16 illustrates the difference 
between the two technologies. The test device for conventional IED functional testing 
simulates the substation current and voltage signals, binary (opto) inputs and the IED outputs 
through hard-wired interface. The IED outputs are measured to detect the operational 
performance of the IED against its specified design. Function testing of an IED using GOOSE 
messaging has the same approach expect the inputs and outputs between the test device and 
the IED are simulated and monitored through the station bus network. Apostolov & Vandiver 
(2007) discusses that its good practice to monitor and compare the operation of an IED’s 
output and a GOOSE message driven by the same functional element in the IED logic. 
 
Figure 16: Conventional Vs IEC 61850 GOOSE Testing Setup (Apostolov & Vandiver, 2007) 
 
Kanabar & Parikh (2011) described the importance of GOOSE integration and communication 
network configuration verification testing. Verification test were achieved using the wireshark 
tool to capture the GOOSE message over the network and check the data fields of the 
message. Verification of the Ethernet switched network was essential using a network analyser 
to confirm the MAC address of all connected devices as well Multicast domains (VLAN) of 
Ethernet switches. 
2.5 Risk Assessment Methodology 
CIGRE working group B5.32 (2009) discuss the importance of test coverage during testing. 
Their recommendation is to implement the Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) or Failure 
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Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) risk assessment methodologies for identifying potential 
functional and component failures and possible physical and logical node failures to systems. 
The working group describes physical components like IED’s and switches as typically 
programmed electronic devices (PED), while logical nodes are treated as black boxes and their 
failure modes are limited to loss or degradation of an expected behaviour. Logic nodes are 
defined by IEC 61850 as having all of the properties of a programmed electronic system (PES) 
and therefor the guide words used by IEC 61882 for a PES can be utilised for a HAZOP 
assessment on an IEC 61850 logical node. 
Fenelon & Hebbron (2007) discusses the increasing use of HAZOP for analysing programmable 
electronic systems and the starting point for a HAZOP study is the deviation from the design 
intent. Once identified the HAZOP then aims to identify potential causes (faults) and 
consequences (System-level failure modes) of that deviation. The system allows the use of 
protection, detection and indicating mechanisms to identify possible potential causes (faults) 
and consequences (System-level failure modes). Fenelon & Hebbron (2007) describes the 
HAZOP methodology particularly useful for identifying weaknesses in systems. 
Pentti & Helminen (2002) describes the use of FMEA as an important procedure by which each 
potential failure mode in a system is analysed to determine the results or effects thereof on 
the system and to classify each potential failure mode according to its severity. Pentti & 
Helminen (2002) discusses the use of FMEA in safety-critical software-based automation and 
industrial automation systems and provides examples for its use to perform a functional 
approach that recognizes that every item is designed to perform a number of outputs. The 
outputs are listed and their failures analysed. 
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  Chapter 3
Project Design Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
With only a handful of small IEC 61850 substations commissioned and placed into service in 
Australia, with majority of them designed, constructed, tested and commissioned by IED 
manufactures like ABB and SIEMENS. It is critical to develop a design methodology to 
understand the design rules and specifications to implement GOOSE messaging on a station 
bus network. The project design methodology will use a top down engineering approach to 
critically analysis the following.  
3.2 Current Protection and Circuitry Design 
3.2.1 Overview 
Ergon Energy currently has a number of design standards for implementation of new and 
refurbishment substation projects. All of these standard designs utilise the use of conventional 
protection relays, Remote Terminal Units (RTU), conventional primary plant (CT’s and VT’s) 
and hard copper wiring between secondary systems and primary plant. It is critical to 
understand Ergon Energy’s current protection and circuitry design philosophies to be able to 
establish a connection between current practices and future practices using GOOSE messaging 
at a station bus level. This section will identify and describe the protection and interlocking 
functions that could potential be implemented utilising GOOSE messaging at a station bus 
level. A simplified substation protection single line diagram using Ergon Energy’s current 
substation standards and conventional infrastructure is illustrated in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Current Ergon Energy Substation Standard Protection Single Line Diagram 
3.2.2 Circuit Breaker Failure Protection (CBF) 
If a protection relay detects a fault or abnormal operating state on the power system the 
protection systems intended purposes is to clear the fault by opening the circuit breaker 
nearest to the fault. If the circuit breaker fails to open due to a mechanical or electrical 
malfunction, a backup protection scheme is essential. Without a backup protection scheme 
there is a potential risk of damage, injury or loss of life, and disruptions to the security and 
reliability of the network. Circuit breaker fail protection, provides this backup functionality and 
is used to trip upstream circuit breakers to ensure the fault is isolated from the network.  
Figure 18 illustrates Ergon Energy’s current circuit breaker fail protection logic. The CBF 
protection scheme is initiated from all protection functions that have the potential to trip the 
circuit breaker for a power system fault. Two conditions need to be satisfied before a CBF trip 
is sent from the initiating protection relay to the upstream circuit breakers. Firstly, the current 
going through any of the phases needs to be above the required pickup level that indicates 
that the circuit breaker is still closed with current flowing in one or all of the phases. If there is 
still current flowing through the circuit breaker and there has been an attempt to trip the 
circuit breaker via a protection function trip, the CBF timer is initiated and starts timing down 
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from its settable value. If the protection function and current check elements are still high 
after the CBF timer expires, a trip will be initiated from the CBF relay or function to the 
upstream circuit breakers, which in turn will clear the fault on the power system. 
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Figure 18: Circuit Breaker Fail Logic 
Figure 19 Illustrates a typically CBF scenario on the simplified substation configuration. If 
Feeder No.1 has a fault on its distribution cable, circuit breaker (CB) No.1 is designed to trip 
and open and will clear the fault from the network. If the fault is still present and circuit 
breaker No.1 fails to open within the settable CBF time and the current is above the settable 
current check threshold, a CBF event will occur. The remaining circuit breakers connected to 
the 11kV bus will need to trip. This is achieved using copper cabling and auxiliary relays. When 
the CBF trip output are initiated from the No.1 11kV Feeder protection relay, the signal is sent 
to the 11kV bus circuit breaker failure multi trip relay. The multi trip relay is energise and it’s 
normally closed contacts will close and a trip signal will be sent to all of the 11kV circuit 
breakers on that particular 11kV bus. This will remove the fault from the network.  As shown in 
Figure 19, CB No.2, CB No.3 and CB No.4 will trip. 
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Figure 19: CBF Event on the Substation 
3.2.3 Sensitive Earth Fault (SEF) Check Scheme 
A large majority of earth faults on the distribution network are high impedance in nature 
because of the resistivity of the return ground path. If conductors fall down onto a road or into 
a tree there is a potential of having limited earth fault current and the standard earth fault 
element of the protection relay will not operate. Ergon Energy currently use a Sensitive Earth 
Fault (SEF) check protection scheme that allows the protection to trip for low current earth 
faults and is independent to the IDMT earth fault protection function within the protection 
relay. The protection scheme uses a current checking functionality via a SEF check relay that 
measures the return current in the substation power transformer neutral connection. If the 
current flowing in the neutral of the transformer is above the SEF check pickup current setting, 
the SEF check relay will initiate a SEF check output, which will in turn energise the SEF auxiliary 
relay. The SEF auxiliary relay normally closed contacts will open and the SEF check input to all 
of the 11kV feeder protection relays will change to a low state. This is sent to every 11kV 
protection relay on the connected 11kV high voltage bus via separate copper cabling. If the SEF 
input is low on the 11kV feeder protection relay, the SEF is armed and the stage one definite 
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time neutral over current function is operative. The SEF function can be turned on via the 
SCADA system or locally on the protection panel, using a SEF enabled selector switch. The SEF 
can also be disabled if the operator enables the work clearance control. The associated logic 
and functions of the SEF scheme is illustrated in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: SEF Check Protection Scheme Logic 
3.2.4 Bus Zone Protection 
Bus zone protection schemes are critical in the event of a fault to the substation high voltage 
busbar due to their high fault currents. Failure to clear the fault could potentially be 
catastrophic to equipment and the safety of personnel working within the substation. 
Significant damage to the busbar and associated equipment from an explosion or fire could 
result in loss of supply to the entire network connected to that particular substation. Ergon 
Energy currently has a number of bus zone protection schemes that are used at different 
voltage levels. The two that will be discussed due to their flexibility and benefits in an IEC 
61850 design is the high impedance and low impedance bus protection schemes. 
3.2.4.1 High Impedance Bus Zone Protection 
High impedance bus zone protection schemes are based on Kirchhoff’s current law. The high 
impedance scheme is a simple, stable, secure and reliable protection scheme. The high 
impedance scheme compares the current entering the bus, with the current leaving the bus. If 
the difference is above the allowable threshold, the scheme will trip all breakers that are 
connected to the bus zone. Figure 21 illustrates a simplified example of the high impedance 
scheme. If current is flowing through the CT’s in the case of load current or a fault external to 
the busbar, all of the secondary current circulates around the CT wiring. The secondary current 
flowing through the operating protection relay sums to zero and the relay will not operate. If a 
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fault occurs on the protection busbar, the secondary current will summate which will equal the 
total secondary fault current. The secondary current will flow through the protection relay and 
if the current is above its settable threshold, the relay will operate. A multi trip relay will 
energise and will trigger a trip signal to every circuit breaker on that particular bus zone, 
clearing any potential sources to the busbar fault. 
 
Figure 21: High Impedance Bus Zone Protection Scheme 
3.2.4.2 Low Impedance Bus Zone Protection 
Similar to a high impedance bus zone, the low impedance bus zone scheme measures and 
compares the current entering the bus, with the current leaving the bus. If the difference in 
current is above the allowable threshold, the protection relay will initiate a trip to all circuit 
breakers connected to that particular bus zone. One of the main differences is that each of the 
currents entering or leaving the bus zone through a CT has separate low impedance current 
inputs to the protection relay. Figure 22 illustrates a typical low impedance bus zone 
protection scheme configuration. Similar to the high impedance scheme, all of the breakers 
should remain closed for a fault external to the bus zone (F1) and in the case of a fault in the 
bus zone (F2), all of the circuit breakers connected that particular bus zone will trip for a fault 
within the zone.  
 
Figure 22: Low Impedance Bus Zone Protection Scheme (Schweitzer Engineering, 2013) 
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The protection relay operates using its sophisticated algorithms to vectorially sum the 
normalized currents from all individual current inputs to calculate the differential current (Iop ) 
in the bus zone. The algorithm also arithmetically sums the current magnitudes to create a 
restraint current (IRT ). Figure 23 illustrates a typical current differential characteristic of a low 
impedance bus protection relay. The differential current (Iop ) is compared with the restraint 
current (IRT ). If the differential current (Iop ) exceeds the threshold above the characteristic 
curve, the protection has identified that an internal bus fault is present and will operate, 
tripping the circuit breakers connected to that particular bus zone. The main advantage of 
using a low impedance scheme is the flexibility of the configurations due to the 
microprocessor-based technology. CT inputs to the relay can be set to different ratios and 
polarity, where in high impedance schemes they need to set the same to ensure the current 
summate correctly. Multiple bus protection zones can be set using isolator or circuit breaker 
status in conjunction with the flexible logic within the protection relay. 
 
Figure 23: Current Differential Characteristic of a Low Impedance Bus Protection (Schweitzer Engineering, 2013) 
3.2.5 Interlocking Schemes  
Interlocking schemes play a vital role in ensuring high voltage equipment is operated correctly. 
Majority of interlocking schemes are designed to protect the operator of the equipment and 
prevents the operator from performing an incorrect sequence of manoeuvres. The interlocking 
is achieved using the switching mechanisms and in the electrical control circuits of the circuit 
breaker. It is critical to have interlocking on high voltage circuit breakers that are connected to 
embedded generation. The interlocking scheme ensures the generator is isolated from Ergon 
Energy’s network by its high voltage distribution circuit breaker when the main sub-
transmission supply is isolated from the substation. This ensures that the network does not 
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loose synchronisation and that the transformer 11kV circuit breaker is not closed on to a 
system that could potentially be unsynchronised with the greater network.  Ergon Energy 
currently has no synchronisation facilities and relies on this tripping and interlocking of circuit 
breakers to ensure synchronisation is maintained throughout the network.  
3.3 Implementation of GOOSE Messaging at Station Bus Level 
3.3.1 Overview 
With the potential GOOSE messaging protection functions and interlocking functions identified 
in section 3.2, a high-level protection single line diagram has been developed. Due to the 
availability of IEC 61850 hardware and software a simplified substation layout will be deployed 
to enable a practical approach for future analysing. The protection single line diagram 
illustrates the changes from using Ergon Energy’s current standards to the introduction of 
GOOSE messaging on the station bus network. The new protection single line diagram with the 
station bus topology is shown in Figure 24. The new protection single line diagram will be used 
to develop the design of the station bus GOOSE messaging. To reduce the potential of human 
errors during the system design and communication engineering, design rules have been kept 
to a minimum and where possible auto-assigned facilities will be used within the engineering 
tools. 
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Figure 24: Protection Single Line Diagram Using IEC 61850 Station Bus 
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The first step of the design process will be developing a GOOSE direction communication 
diagram detailing the directions of the datasets from each IED. This will provide an overview of 
the IED’s that will be publishing and subscribing to each other over the network. A GOOSE 
Protection and Control matrix will be developed detailing each IEDs publishing and subscribing 
datasets and the GOOSE Data items within each dataset. This will provide a logical approach 
for specifying the senders (publishers) and the receivers (subscribers) of messages. This will 
also allow Ergon Energy’s current protection logic configuration files to be modified to enable 
the use of GOOSE messaging within the logic, instead of using conventional opto inputs and 
contact outputs in the design. Generic pickup and timer values will be used for the settable 
protection functions such as CB fail current pickup and timers. The modified logic and setting 
files will need to be loaded into the IEDs using their manufacturer’s proprietary software. The 
second step of the design process is to create the required IEC 61850 configuration files for 
each IED. This process will follow the steps as shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25: Project IEC 61850 Design Process 
IED Capability Description (.ICD) files for each IED that will be connected to the substation 
protection system will be imported into the system configuration tool. Schneider Electric SET 
system configurator tool will be utilised to configure the data exchange between IED’s and 
communication parameters for the substation protection system. This will include specifying 
the senders (publishers) and the receivers (subscribers) of messages. This will be designed 
from the GOOSE connection diagram and GOOSE Dataset matrix. A system configuration 
description (SCD) file will be created after completion of this process. The next step in the 
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engineering process is to export the configured IED description (CID) files from the system 
configurator tool. The CID file for each IED can be loaded into each IED using the Schneider 
Electric MiCOM S1 Studio IED configurator tool and will contain the address and specified 
names used in the SCD system. The third step of the design process will be developing 
configurations for the two LAN switches and setting up the station bus network. 
3.3.2 GOOSE Directional Communication Diagram  
Figure 26 illustrates the GOOSE directional communication diagram for the simplified 
substation. CIGRE working group B5.32 describe a number of design considerations when 
developing a GOOSE messaging network. If GOOSE datasets are represented in directions 
towards the subscribing IED’s, increases the understanding of which IED’s will be affected by 
different GOOSE messages. This is very important during protection isolation. Having datasets 
directionally sent to IED’s for summation of common functions can also potentially decrease 
traffic on the network. An example of this is that a CBF initiate from a failed circuit breaker 
relay can be sent in the dataset that is subscribed by the bus protection IED. The bus 
protection IED would initiate the trip to the remaining breakers on that particular bus via an 
item within the dataset that is used for tripping the substation circuit breakers during a bus 
zone fault. This also applies a similar philosophy as conventional wiring and the use of multi 
trip relays for tripping multiple circuit breakers.  
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Figure 26: GOOSE Directional Communication Diagram 
3.3.3 GOOSE Protection & Control Matrix 
A GOOSE Protection and Control matrix have been developed to provide a detailed network 
overview of the GOOSE Protection and Control messages that are sent by the publishing IED 
and received by the subscribing IED, with reference to the GOOSE directional communication 
diagram. The GOOSE publisher section provides detail of the Publishers GOOSE control block, 
the dataset item number, the IED internal reference or logic node description and the GOOSE 
source path. While the GOOSE subscriber section of the matrix provides a description of the 
receiving message and the IED’s internal reference addresses. The GOOSE matrix is illustrated 
in Table 3.      
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Table 3: GOOSE Protection and Control Matrix 
3.3.4 IED Protection and Control logic  
Existing protection and control logic configuration files have been modified for each IED 
utilising the information contained in the GOOSE Protection and Control Matrix. As per IEC 
61850-7 series, standard logical nodes for protection and control will be utilised where 
possible when elements and functions within these systems are broadcasted onto the 
network. The protection IED’s logic will be configured using MiCOM S1 studio and the 
modifications to the existing PSL will produce a file for the required logic changes to each IED. 
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This enables the link between the protection IED internal logic and functions and their 
association with the receiving and sending GOOSE messages. The IED logic developed and IED’s 
internal logic utilised in this design is illustrated in Appendix B 
3.3.5 Substation Configuration Language (SCL) 
The system design and communication engineering of the simulated substation was performed 
using the Schneider Electric SET system configurator tool, which is utilised to configure the 
data exchange between IED’s and communication parameters for the substation protection 
system. The GOOSE Protection and Control Matrix was used to configure the datasets, logical 
nodes and the publishing/subscribing relationship of each IED. A redundant station bus 
network was configured with the associated IED’s connected to the network.  All of substation 
IED’s ICD files were imported into the system configuration tool to their associated IED’s. Once 
the ICD files were imported into the system, each IED’s GOOSE control block and dataset’s 
were configured with the proposed published logical nodes within each control block. The 
network communication and GOOSE control block communication parameters were 
configured which included the MAC address, APPID, VLAN ID, VLAN priority and retransmission 
times. The next step of the process was to specify the senders (publishers) and the receivers 
(subscribers) of each GOOSE message. The GOOSE control blocks MAC address and APP IDs 
were auto-assigned to a unique number using the tool. This reduced the need to have a design 
rule in place for these parameters and the need to change the parameters manually, which will 
reduce the risk of human error during the configuration process and therefore testing of these 
parameters. One of the advantages of only using Schneider Electric IED’s within this simulated 
network was that the system configuration tool enabled the direct mapping of each GOOSE 
message to the IED’s internal virtual input address. If alternative manufacturers IED’s were 
used in the system, this engineering task would have to be performed within the 
manufacturers IED configurator tool. This manual engineering task could potentially create 
additional engineering and design errors during the mapping of the messages to the IED’s 
internal addresses. Figure 27 illustrates the logical view of the publishing and subscribing 
relationship of the network and the mapping between the IED’s internal virtual input address. 
A system configuration description (SCD) file was created after completion of this process. The 
next step in the engineering process was to import the SCD file into the Schneider Electric S1 
studio IED configuration tool where configured IED description (CID) files were created and 
sent to each IED on the network.  
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Figure 27: SET System Configuration 
3.3.6 Station Bus Network Design 
The simulated substation bus communication network was developed using the topology 
shown in Figure 24. Multimode fibre optic cables were used to connect between each IED and 
the 2520 CISCO switches on the station bus network. The CISCO switches and their associated 
ports were configured for the GOOSE specified VLAN ID of 01 and 10. Traffic control 
management and quality of service (QoS) parameters were set as per recommended default 
parameters. Appendix B provides a list of the CISCO switch configurations.  
3.3.7 IED Isolation Design 
During installation, testing, alteration, upgrading or maintenance of protection and control 
equipment, it is often necessary to isolate protection and control signals to in service 
equipment. Incorrect or no isolation could potentially result in inadvertent tripping which 
would compromise network security and develop interruptions to the network. Additional 
consequences of incorrect or no isolation could lead to associated primary plant without 
adequate protection or control. It is essential to recognise ways in which protection and 
control equipment can be removed from service and the implications of incorrect or no 
isolation. 
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3.3.7.1 Current Design and Practices 
Majority of power utilities that perform work on equipment that is physically connected to in 
service systems and networks have processes in place to ensure correct isolation procedures 
are maintained. Conventional protection and control systems isolation design relies on a 
physical break in the circuit that is connected to the in service secondary systems. This is 
pronominally achieved utilising slide links or knife blade type terminals or withdrawable links. 
Figure 28 illustrates a typical conventional protection scheme and the links that would be 
removed during isolation of the in service equipment. This method for isolation is simple and 
provides physical visibility of the isolation. There are also a number of inherent issues with this 
method. Majority of the time the isolation points are not monitored. If the links are not 
restored correctly or there is a mechanical failure to the isolation point, there is a risk that the 
protection scheme may not operate correctly during a fault condition. The system also has 
limited functionality when integration is required to the in service equipment. All outgoing 
circuits are isolated or the receiving protection device will also need additional isolation, which 
could potentially lead to reduced protection coverage on the network. 
 
Figure 28: Conventional Protection Isolation 
3.3.7.2 GOOSE Isolation Design and Practices 
With the introduction of GOOSE messaging and the removal of physical outputs and 
hardwiring, new isolation design and practices are essential. A physical isolation to the in 
service network can only be achieved by unplugging the station bus fibre optical cable that is 
connected to the IED. This action would result in the loss of the communication network, 
rather than specific signals sent from the IED. An appropriate design is required to ensure the 
network can be maintained and virtual isolation is achieved. This would require the blocking of 
the GOOSE signal from the publishing IED or its effect on the subscribing IED. IEC 61850 does 
not define or provide the methods to virtually isolate GOOSE signals. Prior to IEC 61850 edition 
2, the described purpose and requirements of the “Test” flag (Ed1) was limited and the 
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implementation of  the “Test” and “Blocking” modes were option. This lead to inconsistent 
implementation of these features by different manufacturers and interoperability could not be 
guaranteed between different manufacturers. Isolation design of an IEC 61850 Edition 1 
system would have to rely on creating an independent isolation strategy. This could potentially 
be achieved a utilising a blocking signal within the GOOSE dataset from the published IED or a 
blocking signal applied to the subscribing IED, indicating the received messages from a 
publishing IED is actually under a test condition.  Implementing separate test GOOSE messages 
into the system when a publishing IED is under test could provide an alternative solution. This 
method would be limited to the number of GOOSE subscriptions that could be configured by 
the IED. All of these methods under edition 1 would provide suitable isolation functions, but 
would require the need for additional design and testing due to its nonstandard 
implementation. As described in section 2.4.2, IEC 61850 Edition 2 provides additional 
functions that could potentially be implemented into a virtual isolation process. Table 4 
provides an overview of the performance of the IED Test mode function under IEC 61850 
Edition 2. Implementing the IED performance in “Test” mode into a rugged isolation process 
will allow for integration or maintenance changes to IED’s connected to operational plant and 
equipment. 
 
Table 4: IED Test Performance (Ed 2) 
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  Chapter 4
Risk Assessment Methodology & Test Coverage 
4.1 Risk Assessment Methodology  
4.1.1 Overview  
Only a structured and systematic analysing process will help identify what hardware, 
configurations, and functions that require testing prior to commissioning a substation using IEC 
61850 Station bus GOOSE messaging. This analysing process will be achieved using a risk 
assessment methodology. This will determine if mechanisms are required to validate or verify 
the intended design during the testing and commissioning process. The risk assessment 
methodology that will be implemented to determine these mechanisms is the Hazard and 
Operability Studies (HAZOP) methodology. The two main systems that will be assessed are the 
protection IED’s and the station bus network. 
4.1.2 HAZOP Methodology 
A HAZOP study is a detailed hazard and operability problem identification process. HAZOP 
deals with the identification of potential deviations from the design intent, examination of 
their possible causes and assessment of their consequences (International Electrotechnical 
Commission, 2003). The IEC 61882 standard will be used as the reference standard for this 
assessment. Figure 29 illustrates the flow chart of the HAZOP examination procedure.  
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Figure 29: Flow chart of the HAZOP examination procedure (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2003) 
The first step of the procedure is to select a part of the overall design, examine, and agree of 
that parts design intent. The design intent of that part of the design is explained by the use of 
block logic diagrams and the relevant elements, input values and functions associated with 
these identified. A guide word is selected to assess if the relevant elements, input values and 
functions being studied could potentially have a deviation from the design intent. If a deviation 
from the design intent is identified during this step, it is assessed for possible causes and 
consequences. CIGRE working group B5.32 (2009) and the IEC 61882 recommend the use of 
the HAZOP guide words for Programmable Electronic Systems (PES) and modified guide words 
for logical nodes. The working group describes physical components like an IED and switches 
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as typically programmed electronic devices (PED), while logical nodes are treated as black 
boxes and their failure modes are limited to loss or degradation of an expected behaviour. 
Logic nodes are defined by IEC 61850 as having all of the properties of a programmed 
electronic system (PES). This allows for specific meaning for each guide word. The 
recommended guide words are detailed in Table 5 and Table 6.  
 
Guide Word Interpretation for Programmable Electronic System (*) 
No No data or control signal passed 
More Data is passed at a higher rate than intended 
Less Data is passed at a lower rate than intended 
As well as Some additional or spurious signal is present 
Part of The data or control signals are incomplete 
Reverse Normally not relevant 
Other than The data or control signals are incorrect 
Early The signals arrive too early with reference to clock time 
Late The signals arrive too late with reference to clock time 
Before The signals arrive earlier than intended within a sequence 
After The signals arrive later than intended within a sequence 
Table 5: IEC 61882 HAZOP Guide Words for a PES (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2003) 
 
Guide 
Word Status Measures Controls Settings 
No No status No measurement No Control No settings 
More   Measure > expected   Setting > expected 
Less   Measure < expected   Setting < expected 
As well as     Wrong control   
Part of Not all status Not all measures Not all controls Not all settings 
Reverse 
Inverted 
status Inverted measure 
Inverted 
control Inverted setting 
Other than     
Unknown 
control Unknown setting 
Early       
Too few timing 
setting 
Late Status delay Measuring delay Control delay 
Excess timing 
setting 
Before   Sample out of order     
After   Sample out of order     
Table 6: IEC 61882 HAZOP Guide Words for Logical Nodes (CIGRE WG B5.32, 2009) 
The guide words for a logical node have been developed around failure modes of a logical 
node and its input and output model. This is illustrated in Figure 30 
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Figure 30: Logical Node Model (CIGRE WG B5.32, 2009) 
If a deviation from the design intent is identified and the possible causes and consequences 
cannot be reduced or eliminated by a redesign of the system, a mechanism to validate or 
verify the design will be introduced into a test coverage matrix. A test coverage matrix will be 
used to identify the relevant elements, input values and functions that will require validating 
or verifying of the intended design through inspection, testing, measurement or simulations 
during the testing and commissioning process. 
4.1.3 Protection IED Assessment  
A protection IED can be modelled as a mathematical function or be simplified to a basic device, 
where given values of inputs, produces the given value of outputs depending on the 
parameters set or configurations within the IED. This is illustrated in Figure 31. The inputs to 
the IED are typically the analogue current and voltage signals and digital status from the 
substation process such as a circuit breaker indication. The outputs of the IED are determined 
by the IED’s settable configurations or parameters and the value of a certain input to the IED. 
This typically includes the internal logic or parameters that determine behaviour of protection 
functions within the relay such as a CBF event or SEF pickup. The outputs to the process could 
be used to produce an alarm or protection trip to the relevant circuit breakers. The correct 
functionality of the IED is determined by the intended design, but incorrect functionality of the 
IED can be driven by failures to the IED. 
Protection 
IED
Inputs Outputs
Parameters or 
Configurations
 
Figure 31: Simplified Protection IED 
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4.1.3.1 IED Failure Modes 
CIGRE working group B5.32 (2009) describe failure modes of an IED can be broken down to 
functional failures and component failures. Functional failures a defined as conditions where 
the function or in this case the IED has not performed the expected output. These failures 
within a protection scheme could be the protection IED failing to trip a circuit breaker for a 
fault or tripping the incorrect circuit breaker. The following conditions can represent a 
functional failure of an IED and in turn the system. 
 Incorrect output signals/messages or destination of signals/messages 
 Output signals/messages sent to early or to late 
 No output signals/messages sent or incorrect sequence of output signals/messages 
The IED will be broken down to two different component failure modes, physical and logical 
node failures. Physical component failures are failures to the IED’s physical hardware and are 
normally caused by the environment, such as broken hardware, short circuits or physical wear 
and tear or aging on hardware. Where logical node failures are conceptual components such 
as software modules and the logic or code within the IED that act as components. The 
following conditions can represent a logical node failure of an IED and in turn the system. 
 Incorrect setting or parameters  
 Incorrect configuration 
 Incorrect code, firmware or software bugs 
 Incorrect or no input/output signals/messages 
 Input/output/processing signals/messages sent to early or to late 
Establishing correct settings, configurations or parameters on an IED is critical for its intended 
operation and performance. IEEE/PSCR Working Group I18 identified that errors in IED settings 
can arise from many different sources, some technical, some procedural, some administrative 
and some inadvertent (IEEE WG I18, 2011). 
4.1.4 Station Bus Network Assessment 
The station bus network is the backbone of an IEC 61850 substation protection system using 
GOOSE messaging. While the protection IED ensures signals are sent and received for a given 
protection function. The station bus network is the virtual highway for these signals, ensuring 
the signals transmitted from the publishing IED’s are received by the subscribing IED’s. In a 
conventional protection system, copper wiring between IED’s performed this function. The 
design of the station bus network needs to ensure the network architecture provides EMI 
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immunity, reliability, availability, redundancy and maintainability. With the GOOSE model only 
mapped directly to the Link (layer 2) and Physical (layer 1) components, the station bus 
network can be broken down to these components to identify potential failures in the design 
intent. The physical layer consists of the hardware used as the medium to transfer the data 
such as optical fibre or twisted pair copper cabling. While the link layer consist of bridges such 
as network switches. Similar to the protection IED a bridge can be simplified to a basic device, 
where given values of inputs, produces the given value of outputs depending on the 
parameters set or configurations within the device. The most important function of the bridge 
is to enforce network management and provide network redundancy. Dolezilek & Dearien 
(2015) discuss one of the major challenges of testing a station bus network is ensuring the 
network architecture is design to accommodate the required traffic on the network and traffic 
control methods are in place to ensure that the time critical protection data is sent and 
received in the allowable times. IEC 61850-90-4 section 18 provides guidance on network 
testing for IEC 61850 communication networks. The standard recommends that integrator 
acceptance and verification tests should be completed to verify which products meet the 
functional and performance requirements for the intended network configuration under 
worst-case conditions (International Electrotechnical Commission, 2013). This testing is 
normally completed on several design standards and products and the results of the testing 
are used to decide which is the best design and product for the integrators future design 
standards and installations.  
4.1.4.1 Network Failure Modes 
Similar to the IED the network failure modes are physical component failures to the network 
physical hardware and logical node failures to the switches such as software modules and the 
logic or code within the device. The following conditions can represent a physical failure to the 
network hardware.  
 Damaged fibre or cable and/or associated connectors   
 Failure to the switch power supply or electronic circuits 
 The following conditions can represent a logical node failure of a network bridge and in turn 
the system. 
 Incorrect setting or parameters  
 Incorrect configuration 
 Incorrect code, firmware or software bugs 
 Incorrect or no input/output signals/messages 
 Input/output/processing signals/messages sent to early or to late 
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4.1.5 IEC 61850 Station Bus GOOSE Messaging HAZOP Assessment 
With the intended design identified in section 3.3 and the potential failures and possible 
causes of the failures to an IED or network device identified in section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4, a HAZOP 
risk assessment can be carried out on a protection scheme and its associated IED’s, network 
devices and functions that utilise GOOSE messaging on the station bus network. The HAZOP 
flow chart illustrated in Figure 29, the HAZOP examination template in Figure 32 and a 
data/control flow diagram for the scheme will be the tools used to assess the scheme and its 
intended design. This will drive the required testing requirements and actions during the 
testing and commissioning process for this particular scheme.  
 
Figure 32: HAZOP Examination Template  
4.1.5.1 Circuit Breaker Fail Protection Scheme 
Utilising the data/control flow diagram illustrated in Figure 33 and the design of the circuit 
breaker failure scheme, a HAZOP assessment of the circuit breaker fail scheme was developed. 
Appendix C provides the full details of the HAZOP examination and assessment. 
SHEET: 
REFERENCE DRAWING No.: DATE: 
TEAM COMPOSITION:
PART CONSIDERED: 
DESIGN INTENT: 
No. Element Characteristic Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences 
STUDY TITLE: 
Safeguards &/or Test Action
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Figure 33: Data/Control Diagram for CBF Scheme 
4.2 Test Coverage 
4.2.1 Overview 
The results obtain from the HAZOP assessment have identified parts of the system and 
protection elements, settings, parameters, functions, systems and characteristics that need to 
be validated or verified during the testing and commissioning phase to ensure intended design 
is achieved. Appendix D provides details of the full test coverage for the circuit breaker failure 
scheme. This provides methods and practices that will be deployed to validate or verify 
identified parts of the system and protection elements/functions of a circuit breaker failure 
scheme. The following section provides a brief overview of the findings of the assessment and 
proposed philosophies that could potentially be deployed during the testing and 
commissioning phase.  
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4.2.2 IED & Protection Scheme Test Coverage 
4.2.2.1 Conventional IED & Protection Scheme Test Coverage 
With conventional microprocessor based IED’s there are three testing and commissioning 
philosophies exist. These are element testing, logic testing and integration testing (IEEE WG 
I18, 2011). Throughout the industry there are two theories exist for element testing. The first 
is to prove that each programmable element and setting within the IED operates at its settable 
value. This practice continues to utilise the methods that are performed on electromechanical 
and electronic relays when verifying that electronic or mechanical components operate 
correctly at their settable values. The second theory relies on the digital nature of the IED and 
that no or reduced element testing is required. The concept behind this theory is that 
microprocessor based IEDs have superior self-monitoring or supervision capabilities and 
element testing only provides confirmation that the element setting has applied correctly 
within the IED. While both theories recommend that verification, be performed on non-
monitored parts of the IED. This may include the current and voltage transformers, A/D 
converters and the IED’s inputs and outputs. Figure 34 illustrates the components of a 
microprocessor based IED. 
 
Figure 34: Microprocessor IED Typical Components (Power System Relaying Committee, 2009) 
Programmable logic enables the IED to be customised to the specific design of the protection 
or control system. This is implemented utilising logical gates, timers, protection elements, 
opto-inputs and outputs. Logic testing of microprocessor IED’s verifies the programmable logic 
set within the IED operates as per its intended design, such as a protection element delivers a 
signal within the logic to an output that performs a protection trip to a physical circuit breaker. 
While element testing only verifies that the particular element is set correctly within the IED, 
logic testing  verifies that the logical sequence integrated into the IED are valid and operate the 
IED outputs as per the intended design specifications. The integration testing of a protection 
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and control system is the method utilised on site to prove that a piece of plant or equipment is 
correctly connected and integrated into the site to form a complete operational system. This 
ensures that an output from a particular IED sends a signal to the designated piece of plant or 
equipment and the required action is processed and executed. This could potentially be a 
signal to a circuit breaker to trip or a signal to another IED to enable a part of the internal logic 
or protection function. 
4.2.2.2 IEC 61850 IED & Protection Scheme Test Coverage 
IEC 61850 substation systems are based on the open exchange of standardised information 
between any of the substation IED’s. While this concept takes on a similar nature as software 
applications, the IED still takes on the same protection philosophies as a conventional IED. 
With respect to an IEC 61850 station bus system, the main difference is that the I/O of the IED 
is achieve using digital GOOSE messages over the LAN, instead of utilising a physical inputs or 
outputs. An IEC 61850 protection IED still requires settings applied for the protection elements 
and programmable logic configured for internal mapping between virtual inputs and outputs. 
This conceptual model enables an IEC 61850 station bus IED to be broken into three testing 
and commissioning philosophies, similar to conventional IED testing and commissioning. These 
are element testing, logic testing and publishing/subscribing testing. However, a system 
approach to testing can be taken due to the relationship between the elements, logic and 
publishing/subscribing of the IED. These tests can be achieved separately or as an entire 
system depending on proposed implementation of the protection system.  
Similar to conventional microprocessor IED element testing, both theories can exist for an IEC 
61850 IED. If the second theory is applied, that the digital nature of the IED and that no or 
reduced element testing is required, it is critical to ensure other processes and control 
measures are in place to ensure that the potential to have incorrect settings applied are 
significantly reduced. Extensive evaluation and standardisation of IED hardware, firmware and 
software utilised to apply the settings can potentially reduce technical issues. Developing 
standard configurations for the IED’s and testing the standards prior to releasing the files for 
operational or project use can potentially reduce technical issues. While implementing a 
rugged quality assurance system, configuration management system and establishing an audit 
and validation process can potentially reduce procedural, administrative and inadvertent 
issues. These are recommendations from IEEE standard C37.231, IEEE/PSCR working group I18 
and C3. Verification of non-monitored parts of the IED such as the current and voltage 
transformers, A/D converters are still critical. The extent of element testing on either a 
conventional or IEC 61850 IED requires additional engineering justification and assessment. 
This is outside the scope of this project. If element testing can be performed in conjunction 
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with other testing to optimise and reduce the number of test required, this should be included 
during the testing and commissioning process. This will ensure the protection system is not 
solely relying on the digital nature of the device to protect and reliably operate the required 
equipment. 
With this consideration, all future testing coverage will investigate and implement additional 
coverage if possible to cover element testing of the IED. One of the major differences between 
a conventional and IEC 61850 IED is the signal sent from an IED to other parts of the secondary 
systems. While conventional IED’s utilise configurable logic and internal mapping to physical 
outputs to perform this task, station bus IED’s utilise a GOOSE message to be published onto 
the network via the assigned logical nodes (LN) within the dataset. This function is closely 
compared to logic testing of a conventional IED, where test are performed to ensure that the 
configurable logic and protection elements drives the correct output. Adapting this testing 
practice to an IEC 61850 station bus protection will enable the confirmation that the correct 
logical nodes (LN) utilised within the dataset has been assigned and is published onto the 
network. Including element testing into this test can provide additional test coverage. An 
example of this is to measure the operation and accuracy of the circuit breaker failure time 
during this testing. While this is not elements testing, the element that are deployed within the 
GOOSE message can potentially be verified for their correct settable value determined by the 
protection study. In most cases, power system simulation of the protection element would be 
performed. This would confirm the operation and accuracy of the protection IED and the IED 
associated protection element would be measured. While this is a very similar approach to 
testing conventional protection relays, one of the major differences is the sensing of the 
operation of the element. The measurement of the element operation would be performed on 
the station network for the GOOSE message, not a physical contact within the protection relay. 
If the SCL files for the IED under test are utilised within the testing, the GOOSE control block 
and dataset items number can be verified during the same test. Majority of IEC 61850 
complaint test sets import the SCL files for simulation of the GOOSE messages that could 
potentially be published or subscribed by the IED. This would confirm that the configuration 
that drives the protection function logical node has been configured within the IED correctly 
and the logical node has been assigned within the dataset.  
With the above testing confirming, the IED is publishing the correct GOOSE message and some 
type of element testing, verification of that message to the subscribing IEDs is critical. The 
system configuration tool can simply add IEDs as subscribers, but ensuring the IED is 
subscribing to the correct GOOSE message needs to be verified. The system configuration 
engineering process assigns items within each publishing dataset manually to the virtual inputs 
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of the subscribing IEDs. This task could also potentially create a mismatch with the virtual input 
mapping within the system configuration tool and the mapping of the virtual inputs within the 
IED’s internal address mapping or settable protection logic. Testing of the IED’s settable logic 
associated with the GOOSE virtual input mapping can be performed on the individual IED 
similar to the publishing/element testing. While this testing will verify that the correct 
mapping of the GOOSE virtual inputs to the IED and IED associated logic, this testing does not 
verify the entire system. Verification that the IED’s and plant is correctly configured, connected 
and integrated into the site to form a complete operational system is required. With this 
consideration and to optimise testing, testing of the IED’s settable logic associated with the 
GOOSE virtual input mapping and publishing/subscribing configuration of the system can be 
performed together because of their link between multiple IEDs within the IEC 61850 network. 
This testing takes on the same philosophies as integration testing. This ensures that a GOOSE 
output from a particular IED is published onto the network and the subscribing IED receives 
the message and the required action is processed and executed. While the system 
configuration tool enables checking to ensure that the maximum GOOSE messages are not 
exceed on the station bus network. This allows measurement of the full protection scheme 
and the effect the network latency has on the time critical protection GOOSE message under 
potentially normal circumstances. This also provides confirmation that the station switches are 
configured correctly for their traffic control management and quality of service (QoS) 
parameters for that particular system.  
4.2.3 Network Test Coverage 
Fibre optical cables play an import role as the links between the IEDs and network switches. 
Most physical failures to the fibre optic cable occur during the installation of the cable. The 
Telecommunication Industry Association (TIA) of America describe the importance of ensuring 
fibre optic cables are installed correctly. Their Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) on 
networks identified connector contamination and damage to fibre optic cables is the leading 
root cause of fibre optic networks failures. Although physical failures to the fibre optic cable 
present themselves as either operational or not operational during the testing and 
commissioning stage, it is important to reduce the potential of failure after the commissioning 
phase.  AS/NZS ISO/IEC 14763.3:2012 Telecommunications installations—Implementation and 
operation of customer premises cabling Part 3: Testing of optical fibre cabling provides a 
guideline for inspection and test schedules. Utilising the guidelines presented in 14763.3:2012, 
performing a microscopic visual inspection of all end connectors, confirming continuity & 
polarity of cores from end to end provided confirmation that the fibre optical systems has not 
been damaged during construction activities. Conducting end-to-end level check (Light & 
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Source) of each multimode fibre would also eliminate the risk of future issues that maybe 
encountered during or after the commissioning phase. 
As described in IEC 61850-90-4 section 18, switches configurations that affect the GOOSE 
messaging need to be verified, these may include IP addresses, port settings, multicast and 
VLAN filtering and clock settings. This can be achieved using remote access over SNMP or IEC 
61850 objects. IP connectivity between devices on the station bus network can be performed 
using an ICMP messaging tool such as Ruggedping. Running this test for an increased interval 
will enable the monitoring of any loss data packets during the testing. Removal of fibre optic 
cables and switches from the network should be completed to test redundancy and network 
resiliency. This testing will confirm that the GOOSE traffic will continue to flow and failures to 
the network are reported and messages are received within the required times. While its 
critical to ensure network switches have been design to cover the systems traffic control 
management and quality of service (QoS) requirement, IEC 61850-90-4 recommend that these 
parameters a verified during type testing of systems not during the onsite testing and 
commissioning. 
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  Chapter 5
Laboratory Simulation & Testing 
5.1 Overview  
This chapter provides details of the practical Laboratory testing using the simulated protection 
system illustrated in Figure 24.  The test coverage matrix that was developed in section 4.2 will 
be used to develop methods to validate or verify the intended design of the IEDs and network. 
Validation and verification will be achieved through the inspection of the network using 
network analysing software and simulations of network faults to operate protection functions 
using an IEC 61850 compliant secondary injection test set. The laboratory testing will provide a 
greater understanding of the methods and technical requirements to safety, reliably and 
efficiently test, commission, and place in service a substation using IEC 61850 station bus 
GOOSE messaging for a circuit breaker failure scheme. This will provide a future reference and 
reasoning on what and why certain functions and components of the GOOSE messaging are 
tested and commissioned prior to placing the plant into service  
5.2 Laboratory Setup & Hardware 
The physical hardware setup of the test racks for the laboratory testing is illustrated Figure 35. 
Only the IED’s associated with the circuit breaker failure scheme have been configured and will 
be utilised for all future laboratory simulations. Each IED associated with the protection 
scheme have been mounted within a number of test racks. The IED’s and switches are 
powered up from the local 48 volt DC power supply utilising copper cabling. Multimode fibre 
optic cables have been used for the connection between the IED’s and the station bus 
switches. While Ethernet cabling will be used as the communication medium between the test 
set, PC and network switch. Test leads will be used to inject the secondary currents and 
voltages into the IED and for monitoring the physical trip contacts from each of the IED’s under 
test.  
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Figure 35: Test Bench Physical Hardware Setup 
5.3 Test Equipment Hardware & Software 
In order to simulate a power system fault that could potential be on the power network an IEC 
61850 compliant (part 8) test set that can communicate with the station bus has been 
deployed. The test set has the capacity to inject secondary currents and voltages into the IED’s, 
while sensing on the communication network for the protection or control GOOSE message. 
The test set has been setup to sense for a change in state to the physical output contact that is 
used to trip each circuit breaker. The test set will also be setup to monitor the physical contact 
outputs that are mapped to the protection functions and elements deployed within the IED’s 
logic. This will help to compare and confirm test results expected when monitoring the 
expected GOOSE message. 
5.3.1 Doble F6150 Test Instrument 
Ergon Energy currently has twenty-four F6150 Doble power system simulators within their test 
sections, where the instruments are currently used for testing and commissioning of 
conventional protection relays and protection schemes. Due to the familiarly with this 
instrument and its operating software and the financial investment Ergon Energy has outlaid 
already to  purchase these instruments, only the Doble F6150 instruments will be investigated 
and deployed as part of this project. The F6150 provides up to 12 sources used to test high-
burden electro-mechanical relays and multifunctional numerical protection relays. The test set 
has the capability to inject voltage, current and frequency utilising the settable macros and 
MiCOM P643 
Test Set Laptop/software 
Network switch 
MiCOM P746 
MiCOM P142 
Network switch 
Multi-trip relay 
61 
 
parameters within the interface software. Configurations of the sources are internal and are 
independently controlled by the interface computer. The instruments can be configured for 
multiple logic input and logic output channels that allow the simulation and a mean to 
measure the protection scheme performance for the simulated power system fault. The Doble 
can be purchased or upgraded to enable IEC 61850 communications with IEC 61850 IED’s or 
station bus network. The instruments F6860 IEC 61850 GSE Interface module option needs to 
be purchased and enabled via a firmware upgrade to existing test instruments. This allows the 
instrument to support IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging as per part 8 of the IEC 61850 standard. 
The front panel of the instrument that is used to interface between the F6150 and IED’s/ PC is 
illustrated in Figure 36 and the hardware architecture of the F6150 and F6150sv is illustrated in 
Figure 37. 
 
Figure 36: Doble F6150 Front Panel 
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Figure 37: Doble Hardware Architecture 
5.3.2 Doble Protection Suite & GSE Configurator Tool   
Protection Suite is the software application used in conjunction with the Doble F6150 test 
instrument. Protection suite enables the operator to setup the automated power system 
simulations to the IED’s and protection schemes. The automated test plans have a number of 
pre-defined test types and simulation macro’s that allow the user to confirm the operation and 
accuracy of the IED and IED functions as well as the performance of the complete protection 
scheme. The Doble F6150 test instrument needs to be configured to the correct network 
parameters and GOOSE messaging parameters as per the site SCL files. To enable these 
changes, Doble’s IEC 61850 GSE configurator software is required to configure the F6150 
power system simulator. This allows testing of the protection schemes and IED’s that use the 
IEC 61850 standard for sending and receiving of GOOSE messages over the Ethernet substation 
LAN. The GSE configurator tool utilises the IEC 61850 SCL to interface and configure the 
protection suite software, which enables the use of GOOSE messaging within the required test 
simulations. The project or site SCL files (ICD, SCD, CID) are imported into the GSE configurator, 
which results in a detailed listing of the messages and the dataset items within the imported 
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SCL file. The GOOSE subscription and publishing services are used within the GSE software to 
configure the required subscription (Input or Reception) and publishing (Output or 
Transmission) between the IED’s under test and the F6150 hardware. This setup takes on a 
similar role to conventional protection testing, where opto inputs or contact outputs from the 
relay would be deployed and configured within the protection suite software to simulate and 
confirm the operation and accuracy of the protection relay. To enable the F6150 instrument to 
send and receive GOOSE messages within the protection suite test plan, each item within the 
dataset that is required in the test simulation is assigned a virtual input (GN) or virtual output 
(GP). Two file formats are developed using the GSE configurator tool. The Substation Messages 
File (.GSX) contains all of the listed messages, dataset items and user given names. The Test 
Configuration File (.GSX) contains saved substation messages and selected dataset items that 
are used in the mapping of the F6150 inputs (GNx) and outputs (GPx). The .GSX file is sent to 
the F6150 to enable to selected configuration. Figure 38 illustrates the process for configuring 
the instrument and Protection Suite software. 
 
Figure 38: Doble F6150 IEC 61850 Configuration Process 
5.3.3 Wireshark 
When conventional hardwired inputs and outputs are deployed in a protection system, the 
analysing and investigation of the signals over the network of copper cabling could be 
performed by measuring voltages at the required point of interest. With GOOSE messaging this 
is not possible and a network protocol analyser is needed to view the packages of data that is 
travelling within the communication network. Wireshark® is a free and open-source packet 
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analyser that is used for network troubleshooting, analysing and software development. 
Wireshark captures and interactively browses the traffic running on a computer network and 
runs on most computing platforms. The GOOSE filter within the Wireshark software enables 
the user to view the GOOSE messaging traffic on the network. Figure 39 illustrates a captured 
GOOSE message frame using the Wireshark software. The details within the GOOSE message 
shows that the message has the frame structure as defined in IEC 61850-8-1 and section 
2.2.3.3. Note, the GOOSE message priority tagging and VLAN section of the message is stripped 
from the capture due to the PC network interface card (NIT). Software changes to the NIT 
driver and register will enable this capture function.  
 
Figure 39: Wireshark GOOSE Message Capture 
5.4 11kV Feeder IED CB Failure Simulation & Testing 
5.4.1 Overview 
The 11kV Feeder IED circuit breaker failure (CBF) simulation will be used to demonstrate 
methods to verify and validate item 6 under the test coverage matrix.  This test will ensure 
that the circuit breaker failure logical node (RBRF) is assigned within the GOOSE dataset and is 
publishing on to the network. The following section provides the details of the hardware and 
software setup to achieve this test simulation. The I>2 definite time protection element will be 
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used to trigger a circuit breaker failure event. The I>2 definite time elements is set at a current 
setting of 1A secondary and a time delay of 500ms. The CB fail time is set to 200ms and the 
current check element is set to 100mA. A measurement will be performed at the station bus 
switch and the test set will be sensing for a change in state to the FA2 GOOSE CBF trip 
message. This test will not just confirm the correct publishing of the CB fail logical node onto 
the network, but will also confirm the correct operation and accuracy of the IED CB failure 
timer setting. A measurement will also be performed at the existing conventional CB fail 
output contact to compare the performance. 
5.4.2 Hardware Setup 
Figure 40 illustrates the hardware setup of the station bus network, IED, test set and test leads 
used for injecting secondary current and voltage and measuring the operation of the CBF 
output contact.  
Copper cabling (AC Test Signal (CT’s & VT’s))
Copper cabling (Circuit Breaker Trips & CBF Trip Contacts)
Fibre Optic cables (Station Bus Network (Ethernet))
Fibre Optic cables (Station Bus Network (Ethernet))
FA2 - Multi Function 
IED (MiCOM P142)
IEC 61850 compliant 
secondary injection test set
Laptop with network 
analysing software & 
Doble test software
Fibre Optic cables (Test Devices Network Connection (Ethernet))
Cisco 2520 Station 
Bus Switch
Cisco 2520 Station 
Bus Switch
 
Figure 40: IED CB Failure Hardware Setup 
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5.4.3 Software Setup 
5.4.3.1 GSE Configurator  
The GSE configurator software has been configured to allow the sending and receiving of the 
GOOSE messages over the substation LAN from the FA2 IED. The project SCL file (SCD) has 
been imported into the GSE configurator, which results in a detailed listing of the messages 
and the dataset items within the imported SCL file. The GOOSE subscription and publishing 
services are used within the GSE software to configure the required subscription (Input or 
Reception) and publishing (Output or Transmission) between the IED’s under test and the 
F6150 hardware. This software setup is illustrated in Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: GSE Configurator Setup 
To enable the F6150 instrument to send and receive GOOSE messages within the protection 
suite test plan, each item within the dataset that is required in the test simulation is assigned a 
virtual input (GN). The .GSX file that contains the listed messages, dataset items and user given 
names is sent to the F6150 to enable to selected configuration. Figure 42 illustrates the 
process for configuring virtual inputs (GOOSE messages) for the Doble. 
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Figure 42: GSE Configurator Virtual input setup 
 A Protection Suite test plan was configured for the testing of the GOOSE CB fail simulation. 
This is illustrated in Figure 43. The test plan was setup for a pre-fault condition; this simulation 
acts as a normal operating state on the network. There is no fault present during this state that 
could potentially trigger a CB fail event. After the prefault condition (500ms), a definite time 
fault (I>2) was injected by the test set and the definite time pickup would be reached. This 
event would trigger the circuit breaker failure logic illustrated in Figure 18. The CB fail timer is 
initiated and starts timing down from its settable value (200ms). If the protection function and 
current check elements are still high after the CBF timer expires, a CBF trip will be initiated via 
the CBF output contact and a change in state to the GOOSE message CBF bit.  
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Figure 43: Protection Suite Test Plan – GOOSE & Output contact CBF Event 
5.4.4 IED CBF Test Results 
The measured test results are illustrated in Figure 44. Timer 1 is the time received at the 
station bus switch for the CB failure GOOSE message and Time 2 is measured at the FA2 IED CB 
failure trip contact. This test verifies that the CB failure GOOSE message is published correctly 
onto the network and that the CB failure timer is set to the correct setting within the IED. 
 
Figure 44: CB Failure GOOSE Message and Output Test Results 
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5.5 Circuit Breaker Failure Scheme Simulation & Testing 
5.5.1 Overview 
The circuit breaker failure scheme simulation will be used to demonstrate the simulation and 
testing methods to verify and validate items 3 and 7 under the test coverage matrix. The 
following section provides the details of the hardware and software setup to achieve this test 
simulation. 
5.5.2 CBF Scheme Deploying GOOSE Messaging  
This testing will simulate and measure the results for a circuit breaker failure scheme utilising 
the GOOSE messaging on the station bus network. Similar to 5.4, the I>2 Definite Time 
protection function will be used to initiate a circuit breaker failure protection event on feeder 
circuit breaker FA2. The I>2 definite time protection function is set at a current setting of 1A 
secondary and a time delay of 500ms. The CBF time is set to 200ms and the current check 
element is set to 100mA. FA2 IED CBF function logical node (RBRF) will be used to publish the 
CBF event onto the network. This will result in a change to the mapped logical node FA2 
dataset1. The change in the dataset state will trigger the retransmission scheme, which will 
allow for a rapid spray of GOOSE messages onto the network. The bus IED has been configured 
to subscribe to the CBF GOOSE message, where it will process the virtual input within its 
internal logic. The bus zone IED will process the change in state within its internal logic, which 
will initiate a CB fail bus zone trip to the remaining breakers connected to that particular bus 
by broadcasting on its dataset 1. Subscribing IED FA1 and FA4 virtual input 2 will change to a 
high state. Once the GOOSE message is processed by FA1 and FA4, the IED’s internal 
protection logic will initiate a trip to the circuit breaker trip output contact (via RL3). 
Measurement to confirm the correct operation, performance and accuracy of the IED GOOSE 
message will be performed at each IED’s trip contact. This testing will verify the time to 
operate the entire circuit breaker failure scheme to the IED’s HV circuit breaker trip contact. 
5.5.2.1 GOOSE Messaging Hardware Setup 
Figure 45 illustrates the hardware setup of the station bus network, IED, test set and test leads 
used for injecting secondary current and voltage and measuring the operation of the CBF 
scheme. Sense leads have been connected to FA1, FA2 and FA4 output trip contacts to 
measure the operation of trip that would potentially be sent to the HV circuit breaker. 
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Figure 45: Hardware Setup for CBF Scheme-GOOSE Messaging 
5.5.2.2 GOOSE Messaging Software Setup 
A Protection Suite test plan was configured for the testing of the GOOSE messaging scheme. 
This is illustrated in Figure 46. The test plan was setup for a pre-fault condition; this simulation 
acts as a normal operating state on the network. There is no fault present during this state that 
could potentially trigger a CB fail event. After the prefault condition (500ms), a definite time 
fault (I>2) was injected by the test set and the definite time pickup would be reached. This 
event would trigger the circuit breaker failure logic illustrated in Figure 18. The CB fail timer is 
initiated and starts timing down from its settable value (200ms). If the protection function and 
current check elements are still high after the CBF timer expires, a CBF trip will be initiated via 
the GOOSE message CBF bit. 
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Figure 46: Protection Suite Setup - GOOSE CB Fail Scheme 
5.5.2.3 GOOSE Messaging Test Results 
The measured test results are illustrated in Figure 47. Timer 1 is the time to operate the FA2 
IED trip contact that would be used to energise the high voltage circuit breaker trip coil. The 
testing shows that the contact takes around 23.3 ms to operate after the fault has been 
detected by the IED and time delay has expired, this time includes the IED’s processing and 
physical operation of the contact. Timer 2 and 3 are the times measured at the trip contacts of 
FA1 and FA4. These contacts would be used to trip their associated circuit breakers for a CB fail 
event. The results show that it takes around 29.4 ms to 31.8 ms after the fault and the CB fail 
event to send a trip out to the remaining IED’s connected to the HV bus. This includes the 
processing at each IED’s internal logic and the transfer of the message between the switch for 
each IED. Figure 48 illustrates the network traffic captured using Wireshark for a CB fail event. 
The figure shows the re-transmission scheme that is utilised within IEC 61850 and the change 
in state to the FA2 IED that is used to publish the CB fail GOOSE message. 
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Figure 47: CB Failure Scheme GOOSE Messaging Test Results 
 
 
Figure 48: CBF Event Network Traffic Capture 
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  Chapter 6
    Conclusion 
6.1 Overview 
The development of the IEC 61850 station bus technology and introducing this technology into 
the substation environment has created significant change to current conventional protection 
and control systems. Implementing a station bus system generates a substantial change to 
existing design and construction practices. The specific project objectives have been met and 
will be discussed in this section. 
Analysing current protection functions and design standards established a connection between 
conventional practices and future practices using GOOSE messaging at a station bus level. The 
circuit breaker fail protection scheme, bus zone protection, sensitive earth fault check and 
circuit breaker interlocking are potential protection schemes and functions that can utilise the 
IEC 61850 station bus.  While majority of protection philosophies and the need for the 
protection scheme remain the same, the manner in which the system operates, executes and 
processes the protection scheme has changed. The introduction of the station bus technology 
has removed the need to have copper wiring between IED’s for the sending and receiving of 
protection and control signals. The introduction of Ethernet based Local Area Networks (LAN) 
to send and receive protection and control signals has greatly reduced the circuitry 
requirements of a substation, but has greatly increased the configuration engineering process. 
With this change, new engineering processes and standards, new engineering tools, and the 
skills to perform the engineering have been introduced. Despite the fact that the IEC 61850 
engineering process and the use of the substation configuration language are part of the IEC 
61850 standard, there are still a number of capability concerns and inconsistencies when 
different manufacturers are introduced into the design process. The need to perform 
additional engineering steps with proprietary IED configuration tools introduces additional 
design errors and therefore additional testing.   
The development of IEC 61850 Edition 2 has corrected technical issues, improved 
inconsistencies and clarified interoperability issues encountered from different IED 
manufacturers under Edition 1. IEC 61850 Edition 2 “Function Test” and “Simulation” modes 
have provided greater functionality that could potentially be utilised during the testing and 
commissioning of an IEC 61850 substation. All of the isolation methods under edition 1 would 
provide suitable isolation functions, but would require the need for additional design and 
testing due to its nonstandard implementation. The “Function Test” mode has the capability to 
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be integrated into a virtual isolation process, which would be used as an isolation mechanism 
for in service protection isolation. This edition 2 method for isolation would need limited 
testing to verify its intended design because of the conformance testing of this function are 
performed under part 10 of the standard. 
The Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) has been identified as an effective, structured and 
systematic analysing process. The HAZOP study identified potential deviations from the IEC 
61850 station bus circuit breaker failure protection scheme design intent. The HAZOP 
identified potential causes (failures or faults) and consequences of that deviation. The highest 
potential deviations have been identified as logical node failures. These are conceptual 
components such as software modules, logic, settings or parameters and code within the IED. 
This is due to the software base nature of IEC 61850. IED physical hardware deviations are 
limited due to the IEDs having superior self-monitoring or supervision capabilities. Fibre optic 
cables used to connect the station bus are the main physical hardware deviation on the 
network. While most deviations occur after the commissioning, it is vital to have inspection 
and test schedules to reduce the potential of failure during the operation life of the network. 
Extensive evaluation and standardisation of IED and network hardware, firmware and software 
utilised to apply the settings can potentially reduce these technical deviations. While 
implementing a rugged quality assurance system, configuration management system and 
establishing an audit and validation process can potentially reduce procedural, administrative 
and inadvertent issues. 
Deviations from the design intent identified from the HAZOP assessment were reassessed if 
the possible causes and consequences could be reduced or eliminated by a redesign of the 
system. If the possible causes and consequences could not be reduced or eliminated by a 
redesign of the system, a mechanism to validate or verify the design was introduced into a test 
coverage matrix. A test coverage matrix identified the relevant elements, settings, parameters, 
functions, systems and characteristics that will require validating or verifying through 
inspection, testing, measurement or simulations during the testing and commissioning 
process. 
The testing and commissioning philosophies that exist for conventional microprocessor based 
IED’s and their protection scheme have a similar concept to IEC 61850 IED’s and their 
associated protection scheme.  However, a system approach to testing can be deployed on an 
IEC 61850 system due to the relationship between the elements, logic and 
publishing/subscribing of the IED. Verification of non-monitored parts of the IED such as the 
current and voltage transformers, A/D converters are still critical, similar to a conventional 
microprocessor based IED’s. The introduction of reduced or no element testing on an IEC 
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61850 IED because of its digital nature require additional engineering justification and 
assessment. To reduce and optimise the number of test required, element testing can be 
performed in conjunction with publishing verification of the IEC 61850 IED.  Testing and 
confirming that the correct logical nodes (LN) utilised within the dataset has been assigned and 
is published onto the network is essential, including element testing into this test can provide 
additional test coverage. Verification that the subscribing IED receives the message and the 
required action is processed and executed is vital. This testing can achieved separately or as an 
entire system depending on proposed implementation of the protection system. Testing of the 
network and fibre optic system should be performed with reference to AS/NZS ISO/IEC 
14763.3:2012 and in IEC 61850-90-4 section 18. 
New testing and commissioning tools are required to perform the required verification and 
validation of the protection system, this also drives the need for new and improved skill sets of 
the personnel performing these tasks. The development of the simulated substation helped to 
evaluate the new engineering processes and standards and new engineering tools. The 
laboratory testing utilising the developed simulated substation provided a greater 
understanding of the methods, tools and technical requirements to perform these tasks 
identified under the test coverage matrix. 
The introduction of the Station Bus technology has a significant change in the way a substation 
protection system is tested and commissioned with substantial changes to current 
philosophies and practices. 
6.2 Further Work 
Investigate and analyse utilising a HAZOP study all protection functions that can be deployed in 
an IEC 61850 station bus system. This will identify the full testing and commissioning 
requirements for a station bus system. Testing and commissioning quality assurance 
documentation can be developed after a full assessment has been achieved and will enable 
development of the assessment criteria. 
Investigate and assess the testing and commissioning requirements if process bus technology, 
such as merging unit and smart IED’s are implemented into the system. 
Develop a Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) risk assessment to identify potential preventive 
maintenance requirements on an IEC 61850 station bus system. This assessment will allow 
utilities to develop maintenance strategies and procedures for an IEC 61850 station bus 
system. 
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Appendix A: Project Specification 
University Of Southern Queensland 
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND SURVEYING 
 
ENG4111/4112 Research Project 
PROJECT SPECIFICATION 
 
FOR:    Robert Peter ACCENDERE  
TOPIC: An Investigation into the Testing and Commissioning Requirements 
of IEC 61850 Station Bus Substations 
SUPERVISOR: Dr Tony Ahfock 
SPONSORSHIP: Ergon Energy 
PROJECT AIM: To investigate and provide a better understanding of the methods 
and technical requirements to safety, reliably and efficiently test and 
commission and place in service a substation using IEC 61850 
station bus GOOSE messaging. 
PROGRAMME: (FINAL) 
1) Research the background information relating to the IEC 61850 
standard, legislation requirements for testing of substation 
protection systems, testing and commissioning techniques and 
processes for substation protection systems. 
 
2) Identify the configuration tools, test equipment and software used 
for the design, testing and commissioning of an IEC 61850 station 
bus substation using the GOOSE messaging 
 
3) Analyse the protection functions and test required for verifying 
associated IED’s logic/protection functions that uses the GOOSE 
messaging within an IEC 61850 station bus substation. 
 
4) Analyse the site integration test required for verifying the station bus 
network, protection inter-tripping schemes and protection isolation 
within an IEC 61850 station bus substation. 
 
5) Analyse IED’s logic/protection functions that uses the GOOSE 
messaging within an IEC 61850 station bus substation against 
conventional protection relay logic/protection functions. 
 
As time permits: 
6) Test analysed site integration tests using simulated substation. 
 
7) Analyse the maintenance requirements for an IEC 61850 IED.  
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IED Modified PSL-P643 
 
 
IED Modified PSL-P746 
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CISCO 2520 Switch Configurations 
Version 2.0 
no service pad 
service tcp-keepalives-in 
service timestamps debug datetime msec show-
timezone 
service timestamps log datetime localtime 
service password-encryption 
no service dhcp 
! 
hostname ErgonSw1 
! 
boot-start-marker 
boot-end-marker 
! 
logging buffered 64000 
username admin password 0 Password 
aaa new-model 
! 
aaa session-id common 
clock timezone EST 10 0 
system mtu routing 1500 
no ptp profile  
ptp mode forward  
! 
no ip igmp snooping 
login on-failure log 
login on-success log 
! 
errdisable recovery cause bpduguard 
errdisable recovery cause link-flap 
errdisable recovery cause storm-control 
! 
spanning-tree mode mst 
spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default 
spanning-tree extend system-id 
! 
spanning-tree mst configuration 
 name 61850_MSTP 
 revision 1 
 instance 1 vlan 01-10 
! 
spanning-tree mst forward-time 12 
spanning-tree mst max-age 16 
spanning-tree mst 0-5 priority 32768 
! 
alarm profile defaultPort 
 alarm link-fault not-forwarding not-operating fcs-
error  
 syslog link-fault not-forwarding not-operating fcs-
error  
 notifies link-fault not-forwarding not-operating fcs-
error  
! 
alarm relay-mode negative 
alarm facility power-supply rps notifies 
alarm facility power-supply voltage disable 
! 
vlan internal allocation policy ascending 
! 
vlan 01 
 name Main 
! 
vlan 10 
 name Backup 
! 
ip ssh time-out 60 
ip ssh authentication-retries 2 
ip ssh version 2 
! 
class-map match-any HIGH_CLASS 
 description Match GOOSE COS value for output QOS 
  match cos  4  5  
class-map match-any GOOSE_CLASS 
 description Match Goose VLAN 
  match vlan  01 
! 
policy-map OUT_POLICY 
 description Limit total traffic to 10Mb for Relay 
 class HIGH_CLASS 
    priority 
    police 9000000 
 class class-default 
    shape average 1000000 
policy-map GOOSE_TAG 
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 description Set all GOOSE VLAN traffic as COS 4 
 class class-default 
   set cos 4 
policy-map IN_QOS_POLICY 
 description Tag traffic based on VLAN 
 class GOOSE_CLASS 
   service-policy GOOSE_TAG 
policy-map OUT_QOS_POLICY 
 description Limit GOOSE to Priority 20Mb Max, 
Remaining for default 
 class HIGH_CLASS 
    police cir 20000000 
    priority 
 class class-default 
    bandwidth percent 80 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 description Trunk to BUS1 
 port-type nni 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 1,10 
 switchport mode trunk 
 logging event status 
 duplex full 
 storm-control broadcast level 10.00 
 storm-control action trap 
 spanning-tree link-type point-to-point 
 service-policy input IN_QOS_POLICY 
 service-policy output OUT_QOS_POLICY 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/2 
 description Trunk to FA1  
 port-type nni 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 1,10 
 switchport mode trunk 
 logging event status 
 duplex full 
 storm-control broadcast level 10.00 
 storm-control action trap 
 spanning-tree link-type point-to-point 
 service-policy input IN_QOS_POLICY 
 service-policy output OUT_QOS_POLICY 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/3 
 description Trunk to FA2  
 port-type nni 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 1,10 
 switchport mode trunk 
 logging event status 
 duplex full 
 storm-control broadcast level 10.00 
 storm-control action trap 
 spanning-tree link-type point-to-point 
 service-policy input IN_QOS_POLICY 
 service-policy output OUT_QOS_POLICY 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/4 
 description Trunk to FA3  
 port-type nni 
exit 
 switchport mode trunk 
 logging event status 
 duplex full 
 storm-control broadcast level 10.00 
 storm-control action trap 
 spanning-tree link-type point-to-point 
 service-policy input IN_QOS_POLICY 
 service-policy output OUT_QOS_POLICY 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/5 
 description Trunk to FA4  
 port-type nni 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 1,10 
 switchport mode trunk 
 logging event status 
 duplex full 
 storm-control broadcast level 10.00 
 storm-control action trap 
 spanning-tree link-type point-to-point 
 service-policy input IN_QOS_POLICY 
 service-policy output OUT_QOS_POLICY 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 port-type nni 
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 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/7 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/8 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/9 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/10 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/11 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/12 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/13 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/15 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/16 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/17 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/18 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/19 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/20 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/21 
 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/22 
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 port-type nni 
 duplex full 
 shutdown 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/23 
 description Trunk to Testing conncection Port1 
 port-type nni 
switchport trunk native vlan 1 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 1,10 
 switchport mode trunk 
 duplex auto 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
 storm-control broadcast level 1.00 
 storm-control multicast level 5.00 
 storm-control unicast level 50.00 
 storm-control action trap 
 spanning-tree portfast trunk 
 service-policy input IN_QOS_POLICY 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/24 
 description Trunk to Testing conncection Port2 
 port-type nni 
switchport trunk native vlan 1 
 switchport trunk allowed vlan 1,450 
 switchport mode trunk 
 duplex auto 
 power inline never 
 power inline police 
 storm-control broadcast level 1.00 
 storm-control multicast level 5.00 
 storm-control unicast level 50.00 
 storm-control action trap 
 spanning-tree portfast trunk 
 service-policy input IN_QOS_POLICY 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 description Capture Device SPAN Port 
 port-type nni 
 media-type rj45 
 spanning-tree portfast 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 description NFS SPAN Port 
 port-type nni 
 media-type rj45 
 spanning-tree portfast 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan 1 
 no ip address 
 no ip route-cache 
 shutdown 
 
! 
ip default-gateway 10.128.47.1 
no ip http server 
ip http access-class 23 
ip http secure-server 
ip http timeout-policy idle 60 life 86400 requests 
10000 
no cdp run 
! 
banner login ^C 
*******************************************
******************** 
*                                                             * 
*  Unauthorised access              * 
*                                                             * 
*******************************************
******************** 
^C 
! 
line con 0 
line vty 0 4 
 transport input telnet 
! 
monitor session 1 source vlan 01 , 10 
monitor session 1 destination interface Gi0/1 - 2 
encapsulation replicate 
end  
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Appendix C: CB Failure HAZOP Assessment 
STUDY TITLE:    CBF Protection scheme using GOOSE messaging on a station bus SHEET:  1A 
REFERENCE DRAWING 
No.: 
    
GOOSE Protection matrix and IED internal logic diagrams, GOOSE direction communication diagram, 
system configurations. 
DATE:  
11/08/2015 
PART CONSIDERED:      All IED settings & logic. Publishing and subscribing of dataset contain CBF trips. Network devices 
DESIGN INTENT:      An 11kV CB Fails to trip for a protection fault. Trip remaining CB's on that particular bus to clear fault 
Item No. Element Function 
Guide 
word 
Deviation Possible causes Consequences  
Safeguards &/or Test 
Action 
1A Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Enabled 
in IED 
No CBF function not 
set/enabled in IED 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to send trip to upstream 
scheme/CB to trip. Fail to trip and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm function 
enabled, after settings 
have been loaded into 
IED 
2A Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Current 
Check  
No CBF function current pickup 
set to zero 
Human error, incorrect value 
entered or incorrect template 
used 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF current 
pickup using secondary 
injection test set or 
confirmation via setting 
compare. 
2A Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Current 
Check  
More CBF function current pickup 
higher than design 
Human error, incorrect value 
entered or incorrect template 
used 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF current 
pickup using secondary 
injection test set or 
confirmation via setting 
compare. 
2A Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Current 
Check  
Less CBF function current pickup 
less than design 
Human error, incorrect value 
entered or incorrect template 
used 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF current 
pickup using secondary 
injection test set or 
confirmation via setting 
compare. 
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2B Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Timer  No CBF function timer set to 
zero 
Human error, incorrect value 
entered or incorrect template 
used 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF current 
pickup using secondary 
injection test set or 
confirmation via setting 
compare. 
2B Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Timer  More 
Late 
CBF function timer set 
more than design 
Human error, incorrect value 
entered or incorrect template 
used 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF current 
pickup using secondary 
injection test set or 
confirmation via setting 
compare 
2B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Timer  Less 
Early 
CBF function timer set less 
than design 
Human error, incorrect value 
entered or incorrect template 
used 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF current 
pickup using secondary 
injection test set or 
confirmation via setting 
compare 
3A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CT ratio No CT ratio not configured as 
per physical set ratio  
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CT ratio via 
secondary injection. 
Confirm non-monitored 
system of IED during 
injection 
3A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CT ratio More CT ratio not configured as 
per physical set ratio  
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CT ratio via 
secondary injection. 
Confirm non-monitored 
system of IED during 
injection 
3A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CT ratio Less CT ratio not configured as 
per physical set ratio  
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
CBF Bus when there is no CBF event on 
system. Loss of supply 
Confirm CT ratio via 
secondary injection. 
Confirm non-monitored 
system of IED during 
injection 
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4A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
Logical Node 
for CBF 
No Logical Node for CBF not 
set in dataset 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF logical node 
is in correct publishing 
GOOSE control block as 
per design 
4A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
Logical Node 
for CBF 
Other 
than 
Logical Node for CBF not 
set in dataset 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF logical node 
is in correct publishing 
GOOSE control block as 
per design 
4A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
Logical Node 
for CBF 
No Logical Node for CBF set in 
dataset, but dataset not 
configured in gcb. 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF logical node 
is in correct publishing 
GOOSE control block as 
per design 
4A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
Logical Node 
for CBF 
Other 
than 
Logical Node for CBF set in 
dataset, but dataset 
configured to incorrect gcb. 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm CBF logical node 
is in correct publishing 
GOOSE control block as 
per design 
4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
No No network parameters 
configurator 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to send GOOSE message or 
received by subscribing device. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Run validate 
configuration report 
4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
More gcb configuration revision 
more than subscribing IED 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by subscribing device. 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message and 
have same revision 
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4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
Less gcb configuration revision 
less than subscribing IED 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by subscribing device. 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message and 
have same revision 
4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
No No gcb configuration 
revision 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by subscribing device. 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Run validate 
configuration report 
4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
More VLAN ID for network 
parameter set more than 
VLAN network design  
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by subscribing device. 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message and 
have same revision 
4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
Less VLAN ID for network 
parameter set more than 
VLAN network design  
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by subscribing device. 
Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message and 
have same revision 
4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
More VLAN priority for message 
packet set more than 
GOOSE priority 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by subscribing device in 
expected time if traffic on the network 
is at a level where traffic management 
is required. Fail to trip CB's on bus and 
clear fault in design time. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message within 
the expected design time 
with traffic on network 
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4B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
Less/After VLAN priority for message 
packet set less than GOOSE 
priority 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by subscribing device in 
expected time if traffic on the network 
is at a level where traffic management 
is required. Fail to trip CB's on bus and 
clear fault in design time. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message within 
the expected design time 
with traffic on network 
5A 
Network 
link 
Fibre optic 
cable 
No No data control signal 
passed 
Failure to fibre optic cable or 
connectors 
No data sent to receiving IED's. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault 
Confirm network 
communication using 
tools 
5A 
Network 
link 
Fibre optic 
cable 
Less Data is passed at a lower 
rate than intended 
Failure to fibre optic cable or 
connectors 
No data sent to receiving IED's. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault 
Confirm network 
communication using 
tools 
6A 
Station bus 
network 
switch 
Port 
parameters 
No Ingress Port not 
configurator 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
No data sent to receiving IED's. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault 
Confirm switch 
parameters for network 
and GOOSE message 
6A 
Station bus 
network 
switch 
Port 
parameters 
No Ingress Port not 
configurator to designed 
VLAN ID, traffic control 
management and quality 
of service (QoS) 
parameters. 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
No data sent to receiving IED's. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault 
Confirm switch 
parameters for network 
and GOOSE message 
6A 
Station bus 
network 
switch 
Port 
parameters 
After Late Ingress Port not 
configurator to designed 
VLAN ID, traffic control 
management and quality 
of service (QoS) 
parameters. 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
No data sent to receiving IED's. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault 
Confirm switch 
parameters for network 
and GOOSE message 
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6B 
Station bus 
network 
switch 
Port 
parameters 
No Egress Port not configured 
to design VLAN ID, traffic 
control management and 
quality of service (QoS) 
parameters. 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
No data sent to receiving IED's. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault 
Confirm switch 
parameters for network 
and GOOSE message 
6B 
Station bus 
network 
switch 
Port 
parameters 
After 
Late 
Egress Port not 
configurator to designed 
VLAN ID, traffic control 
management and quality of 
service (QoS) parameters. 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
No data sent to receiving IED's. Fail to 
trip CB's on bus and clear fault 
Confirm switch 
parameters for network 
and GOOSE message 
7A 
Network 
link 
Fibre optic 
cable 
  As per 5A       
8A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
subscribing 
No Bus IED not subscribing to 
11kV FDR IED that sent CBF 
GOOSE message 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by potential subscribing 
device. Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message 
8A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
subscribing 
No Bus IED not subscribing to 
GOOSE source parameters 
or incorrect data within 
parameters 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by potential subscribing 
device. Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message 
9A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
subscribing 
No IED not subscribing to 
message mapped input, 
due to incorrect virtual 
input set in relay logic 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by potential subscribing 
device. Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm subscribing IED 
(Bus) receive message 
and mapped to the 
correct logic within relay 
PSL 
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9A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
subscribing 
Reversed IED subscribing to message 
mapped input, virtual input 
inverted in relay logic 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by potential subscribing 
device. Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm subscribing IED 
(Bus) receive message 
and mapped to the 
correct logic within relay 
PSL 
9A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
subscribing 
More IED subscribing to message 
mapped input, virtual input 
index number more than 
expect in relay logic 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by potential subscribing 
device. Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm subscribing IED 
(Bus) receive message 
and mapped to the 
correct logic within relay 
PSL 
9A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
subscribing 
Less IED subscribing to message 
mapped input, virtual input 
index number more than 
expect in relay logic 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to receive by potential subscribing 
device. Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm subscribing IED 
(Bus) receive message 
and mapped to the 
correct logic within relay 
PSL 
9B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
Publishing 
No No Logic to trip remaining 
CB's on bus, including 
mapping to virtual output 
for publishing 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to send message to subscribing 
IED's to trip bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm publishing IED 
(Bus) logic for Bus trip 
scheme 
9B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
Publishing 
Reversed Logic inverted to trip 
remaining CB's on bus, 
including mapping to 
virtual output for 
publishing 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to send message to subscribing 
IED's to trip bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm publishing IED 
(Bus) logic for Bus trip 
scheme 
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9B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
Publishing 
Other 
than 
Unknown Logic to trip 
remaining CB's on bus, 
including mapping to 
virtual output for 
publishing 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs 
Fail to send message to subscribing 
IED's to trip bus and clear fault. 
Catastrophic to equipment and safety 
Confirm publishing IED 
(Bus) logic for Bus trip 
scheme 
10A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
Logical Node 
for Virtual 
output 
  As per 4A & 4B     Confirm GGIO logical 
node is in correct 
publishing GOOSE 
control block as per 
design 
10B 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Control Block 
& Publishing 
  As per 4A & 4B     Confirm subscribing IED's 
receive message and 
have same revision 
11A 
Network 
link 
Fibre optic 
cable 
  As per 5A       
12A 
& 
12B 
Station bus 
network 
switch 
Port 
parameters 
  As per 6A & 6B       
13A 
& 
14A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
GOOSE 
subscribing 
  As per 9A & 8A   Fail to receive by potential subscribing 
device. Fail to trip CB's on bus and clear 
fault. Catastrophic to equipment and 
safety 
Confirm subscribing IED 
(FDR) receive message 
and mapped to the 
correct logic within relay 
PSL 
15A 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
or Logic 
CB Trip No No mapping to CB trip 
output contact 
Human error, Incorrect setting 
or parameters, firmware or 
software bugs. Failure to 
hardware 
Fail to trip and clear fault. Catastrophic 
to equipment and safety 
Confirm CB trip output 
contact for received CBF 
GOOSE message 
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Appendix D: CB Failure Test Coverage 
STUDY TITLE:    Protection functions using GOOSE messaging on a station bus SHEET:  1A 
REFERENCE DRAWING No.:   GOOSE Matrix, IED internal logic diagrams, GOOSE direction communication diagram DATE:  
11/08/2015 
PART CONSIDERED:      P142 IED settings & logic. Publishing and subscribing of dataset contain CBF trips. 
DESIGN INTENT:      An 11kV CB  Fails to trip for a protection fault. Trip remaining CB's on that particular bus to clear fault 
HAZOP 
No.  
TEST 
No. 
Part of 
System 
Element Function Check Item / test Action Expected Result 
4B-1 1 IED Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE gcb All IED's correct SCL 
revision & network 
parameters confi correctly 
Run validate report prior to downloading files to IED. 
Confirm each IED on the network has same file 
revision 
No error during report and same file 
revisions in each IED on network 
5A, 7A, 
11A 
2 Fibre 
optic 
cables 
Network 
link 
comm's 
medium 
As per AS/NZS 1476.3:2012. 
IP connectivity between 
devices on the station bus 
network  
Microscopic visual inspections of all end connectors. 
Confirm continuity & maintenance of polarity of 
cores from end to end. 
Conduct end to end level check (Light & Source) of 
each Multimode fibre and record results. Conduct 
OTDR test on each Multimode core and store results. 
Using both 850nm and 1300nm wavelengths in both 
directions. Run ruggedping test for an increased 
interval will enable the monitoring of any loss data 
packets during the testing 
As per AS/NZS 1476.3:2012. No packet 
loss during testing 
 
 
 
100 
 
6A,6B 3 Network 
Switch 
Station bus 
network 
switch 
Port 
parameters 
Port configurated to 
designed VLAN ID, traffic 
control management and 
quality of service (QoS) 
parameters. 
Run compare on files to verify standard 
configurations have been applied. Integration testing 
confirm correct VLAN ID and some traffic control 
parameters. Confirm with Wireshark that network is 
communicating and operating as expected 
parameters. 
No error during compare, all settings as 
per design. All traffic communicating as 
expected. Visual inspection of messages 
to confirm file revision and VLAN ID. All 
IED communicating with no alarms or 
errors 
3A 4 IED Confirm 
non-
monitored 
system of 
IED & 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CT/VT 
Ratio 
Verify CT ratio is correctly 
set within the IED and 
confirm non-monitored 
system 
Using a secondary test set inject perform metering 
check. Injection current values to expected load 
limits and confirm relay is stable and no elements 
have started or initiated. Note: To be confirmed 
during on load test, confirm current & MW 
IED current will equal secondary 
injected current with accuracy as per 
manufacturers data. No element 
started or protection trips  
1A, 
2A, 
3A 
5 IED Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF 
Current 
Check  
Verify CBF current check 
element is correctly set 
within the IED and the 
function is enabled.  
Element Testing: Using a secondary test set inject 
current to pickup value, single phase check. Note: It 
is not possible to confirm this setting using the 
GOOSE dataset item/Logical node as the sensing 
element. Elements DDB #373-377 will need to be 
mapped to a output contact to prove this setting.No 
Element Testing: Using IED configurator compare 
function, extract settings from IED and verify that 
settings has been applied. Confirm during timer/LN 
testing CBF function initiated within IED events to 
confirm protection function is enabled. 
CBF should only operate for current 
above the setting value. Accuracy (10%) 
as per manual 
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2B, 4A 6 IED Setting 
value or 
parameter 
CBF Timer 
& Logical 
Node for 
CBF 
Confirm CBF timer is 
correctly set within the 
IED and therefore 
Logical Node for CBF set 
in dataset and 
configured in gab. 
Using a secondary test set, trigger CBF 
initiate from a protection element. Time CBF 
GOOSE output from protection event 
initiate. Measure time at station switch while 
sensing for dataset item Number. Running a 
validation check in the IED configuration tool 
will also confirm the gab is fully configurator. 
CBF should only operate after the 
time setting value. Time (set time 
+ ( 5% or 40ms)) as per the 
manual specs. 
4B,8A,9A,9B,10A,13A,15A 7 IED, 
switch, 
network 
Setting 
value or 
parameter 
GOOSE 
Subscribing 
Verification of message 
to the subscribing IEDs. 
If completed as an 
entire system, 
verification of 
publishing virtual 
outputs for IED to 
remaining IED 
completed during 
testing. 
Confirm subscribing IED receive message and 
mapped to the correct logic within relay PSL. 
This can be performed on each individual IED 
using Test to simulate virtual input and verify 
that the correct message is received and the 
required action is processed and executed 
only on that single IED. If possible a full 
system test can be performed on the system 
to verify the entire integrated system. A full 
system test will also verify the network 
switch parameters. The full system test also 
ensures that a GOOSE output from a 
particular IED is published onto the network 
and the subscribing IED receives the message 
and the required action is processed and 
executed without any additional loss in the 
single time 
Protection scheme operates as 
per the design time. IED subscribe 
and publish as per the design. No 
alarms or error identified during 
testing. No operation of other 
protection schemes 
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Appendix E: Project Management & Safety 
Project Schedule 
The following project schedule has been developed to manage the project milestones, 
activities and deliverables.  Table 7 illustrates the developed project schedule..  
 
Table 7: Project Schedule 
 
Risk Assessment (DTRMP Template) 
The laboratory work will be completed at Ergon Energy’s Protection Group test laboratory in 
Townsville.  Ergon Energy’s Daily Task Risk Assessment Plan (DTRMP) will be used as the risk 
assessment tool for all laboratory work. Prior to performing any work in the laboratory any 
hazards associated with tasks in the laboratory shall be identified and assessed with 
appropriate control measures implemented and documented in accordance with a Daily Task 
Risk Assessment Plan (DTRMP). If any risks cannot be managed or reduced to an acceptable 
level the work will need to stop immediately. Hazards will be assessed according to the DTRMP 
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level of risk matrix that will identify the likelihood and consequence of the hazard. The level of 
risk matric is shown in Table 8 
 
Table 8: DTRMP level of risk matrix 
If the hazard falls within the Medium, High or Extreme level, additional control measures will 
need to be set in place. With additional control measures in place the residual level of risk will 
be assessed according to the DTRMP level of risk matrix that will identify the likelihood and 
consequence of the hazard with the additional control measures.  If any risks cannot be 
managed or reduced to an acceptable level (Low or Very Low) the work will need to stop 
immediately. The two main activities that will be performed in the laboratory will be the use of 
hand tools and test equipment. The hazards and potential consequences associated with 
performing these tasks and additional control measures to eliminate or reduce the residual 
risk are identified in Table 9. Appendix B provides a copy of Ergon Energy’s DTRMP. 
 
Table 9: WHS Risk Control Guide 
Activity Hazard Concequences Control Measure
• Loss of control • Sprain, strain injury 1.  Competence in tool use
• Misuse • Cuts, abrasions 2.  Tool used for intended purpose
• Tool / equipment damage 3.  Required PPE w orn
4.  Ensure tools f it for purpose and operated in 
competent manner
5.  Tools maintained in serviceable condition
6.  Defective tools removed from service, tagged as 
defective and quarantined
• Personal injury 1.  Required PPE w orn
• Electric shock
2.  Test equipment w ithin test date and used by 
competent persons
• Burns
3.  Test equipment used by authorised persons 
(w here required)
• Plant or property damage
5. Check all connections before use
6. Alw ays physically isolate test equipment from input 
supply source w hen not in use
Hand Tool Operation
Testing & Test 
Equipment
• Electrical & Inadvertent 
contact w ith test voltage 
/ current
  4. Comply w ith electrical industry codes of practice 
requirements for w ork on or near LV systems.  These 
include:• Tape off / barricade adjacent panels• Isolate 
danger  tag circuits• Test before you touch• Don’t use 
exposed leads or terminals• Comply w ith AS4836• Use 
LV mats, covers, barriers and 00 gloves, if  required, as 
determined by a risk assessment• Have LV rescue kit 
available at w ork site
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